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Sign Regulation After Reed: Suggestions
for Coping with Legal Uncertainty
Brian J. Connolly* and Alan C. Weinstein**
REGULATING SIGNS IN A CONTENT NEUTRAL MANNER SATISFYING FIRST
AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
FOLLOWING THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S 2015 DECISION IN REED V. TOWN OF
GILBERT, ARIZONA.1 In Reed, all nine Supreme Court justices agreed that
the Town of Gilbert's sign code violated the guarantee of freedom of
speech in the First Amendment, although the justices arrived at that
conclusion in different ways.
As this article will discuss, the Court's opinion in Reed focused on
the appropriate meaning of content neutrality as a central requirement
of the First Amendment with respect to the regulation of noncommer-
cial speech, such as signs. Since the early 1970s, the Supreme Court
has required that regulations of speech must avoid any regulation of
message or subject matter under the theory that government control
of the content of speech-like government control of viewpoint-
equates to government control of ideas.2 In so holding, the Court
has broadly classified content regulation as a suspect form of speech
regulation, and has subjected so-called "content based" regulation t
* Associate, Otten, Johnson, Robinson, Neff & Ragonetti, Denver, CO. Portions of
this article are adapted with permission from Brian J. Connolly, U.S. Supreme Court
Reiterates First Amendment Requires Content Neutral Sign Regulations, 33 PLAN. &
ZONING NEWS 2 (July 2015).
** Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law and Professor of Urban
Studies, Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State
University.
1. 576 U.S. , 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). Before the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Reed, the parties had appeared before the lower courts four sep-
arate times-twice before the federal district court in Arizona and twice before the
U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See discussion infra Part I.B. This article
discusses the history of the litigation, beginning with the Ninth Circuit's decision in
2009 when it heard Reed's first appeal from the 2008 federal district court decision.
2. See, e.g., Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (striking down restriction on
picketing at schools and ruling that any restriction on expressive activity because of
its content would completely undercut the profound national commitment to the prin-
ciple that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open).
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heightened judicial scrutiny and its concomitant burden on govern-
ment defendants.
3
The Reed ruling, which resolves a long-standing split between fed-
eral circuit courts of appeal on the meaning of content neutrality, car-
ries significant consequences for the validity of local sign regulations.
Indeed, many local codes may become unconstitutional as a result of
the case's outcome. Sign litigation can be expensive and risky,4 and it
is likely to become more frequent after Reed.
This article explores the Reed decision and its implications for local
government sign regulation. Section I reviews the Reed case, with an
overview of the context of the decision, the procedural history of the
case, and the Supreme Court's decision-including the "mechanical"
majority opinion and three divergent concurrences. Section II dis-
cusses several of the unanswered questions following Reed identifying
both doctrinal inconsistencies and practical problems. Finally,
Section III provides practical guidance regarding post-Reed sign
code drafting and enforcement for local governments, their lawyers
and planners, who are tasked with the day-to-day regulation of outdoor
signage and advertising.
I. Reed v. Town of Gilbert: Facts and Court's Rulings
A. Factual Background
Reed is the first U.S. Supreme Court case to address local sign regu-
lations since City of Ladue v. Gilleo,5 decided in 1994. Reed addressed
a challenge to Gilbert's sign code, which contained a general require-
ment that all signs obtain a permit, but exempting several categories of
signs from that requirement.6 These provisions treated certain catego-
ries of exempted signs differently.7 As with many other sign codes
around the United States, Gilbert's sign code recited traffic safety
and aesthetics as the reasons for its existence.
8
3. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (subjecting content-based restric-
tion on displaying signs near foreign embassies to strict scrutiny).
4. Although not resolved as of this writing, the plaintiff in Reed had filed a claim
for attorney's fees totaling $1.023 million.
5. 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (Gilleo).
6. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2224.
7. Id. at 2224 25.
8. GILBERT, ARiZ. LAND DEV. CODE, ch. 1 § 4.401 (2014).
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Three of the exempted categories were at issue in Reed: "political
signs," "ideological signs," and "temporary directional signs."9 While
the town did not prohibit any of these categories of speech, each cate-
gory was treated differently by the sign code. The town's regulations
of political signs, defined as "temporary sign[s] designed to influence
the outcome of an election called by a public body," allowed such
signs to have a sign area of up to 16 square feet on residential property
and up to 32 square feet on nonresidential property, and such signs
could be displayed beginning up to 60 days before a primary election
and ending up to 15 days following a general election.'0 Political signs
were allowed to be placed in public rights-of-way, with any number of
signs permitted to be posted."
Temporary directional signs were defined as a "[t]emporary [s]ign
intended to direct pedestrians, motorists, and other passersby to a
'qualifying event.' ",12 A "qualifying event" was any "assembly, gath-
ering, activity, or meeting sponsored, arranged, or promoted by a reli-
gious, charitable, community service, educational, or other similar
non-profit organization."'3 Temporary directional signs could not ex-
ceed six square feet in sign area, could be placed on private property
with the consent of the owner or in the public right-of-way, and no
more than four signs could be placed on a single parcel of private
property at once. '4 Additionally, temporary directional signs could be
displayed for no more than 12 hours before the qualifying event, and
no more than one hour after the qualifying event.15 The date and time
of the qualifying event were required to be displayed on each sign.'
6
9. Reed, at 2224-25; see also GILBERT, ARIZ. LAND DEV. CODE, ch. 1 §§ 4.402(j),
(J), (P) (as amended).
10. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2224 25. Note that Arizona has a statute that prohibits local
governments from removing certain political signs placed in connection with an elec-
tion. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 16-1019(C) (2015). At oral argument in Reed, this statute was
raised by attorneys for the town as a defense to the town's facially content based sign
code. Oral Argument at 42:25-44:00, Reed, 135 S. Ct. 2218, available at http://www.
supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/audio/2014/13-502. While the effect of this statute
was hotly debated during the pendency of the case, the authors are of the position that
this statute is not violative of the First Amendment, nor does it require localities in
Arizona to enact code provisions violative of the First Amendment.
11. GILBERT, ARIZ. LAND DEV. CODE § 4.402(l).
12. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2225.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See id. at 2231.
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Finally, "ideological signs" were defined as any "sign communicat-
ing a message or ideas for noncommercial purposes that is not a Con-
struction Sign, Directional Sign, Temporary Directional Sign Relating
to a Qualifying Event, Political Sign, Garage Sale Sign, or a sign
owned or required by a governmental agency."'7 Ideological signs
could be as large as 20 square feet and could be placed in any zoning
district without limitations on display time.'
8
Good News Community Church, of which Clyde Reed is pastor,
lacked a permanent church structure and instead rented space in
local community facilities, such as schools, for Sunday services.
19
In order to inform passersby of its services and the locations thereof,
Good News and Pastor Reed placed temporary signs advertising reli-
gious services throughout the community.20 The signs were typically
posted for a period of approximately 24 hours.2 1 Because the time
of the posting exceeded the time limits provided for temporary direc-
tional signs, Gilbert attempted in July 2005 to enforce its sign code
against the church's signs, and town officials removed at least one
of the church's signs.22 After receiving the advisory notice that it
was in violation of the code, the church reduced the number of
signs it placed and its signs' display time, but friction with Gilbert
persisted.
23
B. Court Proceedings
Having failed to reconcile its differences with the town, in March
2008, Reed and the church filed an action in federal district court
claiming violations of the Free Speech and Free Exercise clauses
of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the
17. Id. at 2224.
18. The sign code was amended twice during the pendency of the Reed litigation.
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2225, n.4 (citations omitted). When litigation began in 2007, the
code defined the signs at issue as "Religious Assembly Temporary Directional Signs."
Id. The code entirely prohibited placement of those signs in the public right-of-way,
and it forbade posting them in any location for more than two hours before the reli-
gious assembly or more than one hour afterward. Id. In 2008, Gilbert redefined the
category as "Temporary Directional Signs Related to a Qualifying Event," and it ex-
panded the time limit to 12 hours before and 1 hour after the "qualifying event." Id. In
2011, Gilbert amended the code to authorize placement of temporary directional signs
in the public right-of-way. Id.
19. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 587 F.3d 966, 971 (9th Cir. 2009).
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2225.
23. Reed, 587 F.3d at 972.
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Fourteenth Amendment, as well as related state law violations.24 Good
News's claims centered on the contention that the town's sign code
was content based-that is, the code's distinctions between political
signs, ideological signs, and temporary event signs, as well as some
other distinctions, impermissibly discriminated between messages
and speakers based on the content of the regulated speech or speaker.
2 5
The federal district court denied the church's motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction against enforcement of the sign code.26 On appeal, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit unanimously affirmed,
finding the temporary event sign regulations content neutral as ap-
plied. However, the appeals court remanded to the district court on
the question of whether the town impermissibly distinguished between
forms of noncommercial speech on the basis of content.28
On remand, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the town, holding the town's exemptions from permitting content neu-
tral, despite the fact that the code regulated on the basis of message cat-
egory.2 9 The Ninth Circuit again affirmed, this time in a 2-1 decision,30
with the majority finding the code's distinctions between temporary
event signs, political signs, and ideological signs content neutral. In
so holding, the Ninth Circuit found that the town "did not adopt its reg-
ulation of speech because it disagreed with the message conveyed" and
that the town's regulatory interests were unrelated to the content of the
signs being regulated.31 Applying intermediate scrutiny to the content
neutral exemptions, the Ninth Circuit majority determined that the ex-
emptions were narrowly-tailored to advance the city's substantial gov-
ernment interests in aesthetics and traffic safety, and found the code
left the church with ample alternative avenues of communication.
32
C. Circuit Split
The Ninth Circuit majority relied principally on the government's reg-
ulatory purpose in determining that the town's sign regulations were
content neutral, specifically rejecting the conclusion that the Gilbert
24. See Reed, 587 F.3d at 972-73. Only the Free Speech Clause claims were at
issue on appeal.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 973.
27. Id. at 966.
28. Id.
29. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 832 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1085 (D. Ariz. 2011).
30. 707 F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 2013).
31. Id. at 1071-72.
32. Id. at 1074-76.
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sign code was content based because it discriminated on its face be-
tween categories of noncommercial speech.33 Despite the fact that
the sign code expressly created three separate categories for political,
ideological, and temporary event signs, and treated each of these
categories differently-regulation based on content in the literal
sense-the Ninth Circuit's decision relied on the absence of an invid-
ious, discriminatory governmental purpose in upholding the code.
This decision perpetuated a split between the federal circuit courts
of appeal regarding the extent to which government may distinguish
between speech or signs based on category or function.34 This holding
was in line with prior Ninth Circuit decisions35 and paralleled similar
decisions in other federal circuit courts of appeal, including the
Third,3 6 Fourth,3 7 Sixth,3 8 and Seventh3 9 circuits. These courts had
33. See id. at 1071-72.
34. See Brian J. Connolly, Environmental Aesthetics and Free Speech: Toward a
Consistent Content Neutrality Standard for Outdoor Sign Regulation, 2 MICH. J.
ENVTL & ADMIN. L. 185, 197 (2012).
35. See also G.K. Ltd. Travel v. City of Lake Oswego, 436 F.3d 1064, 1076 (9th Cir.
2006) (finding sign regulation to be content-neutral where it does not favor speech based
on the idea expressed); Desert Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Oakland, 506 F.3d 798,
803-04 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding sign code with various arguably content-based ex-
ceptions). Earlier decisions of the Ninth Circuit applied a more strict approach to content
neutrality. See, e.g., Desert Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Moreno Valley, 103 F.3d
814, 820 (9th Cir. 1996); Nat'l Adver. Co. v. City of Orange, 861 F.2d 246, 249 (9th
Cir. 1988). These decisions were called into question by later Ninth Circuit cases.
This transition is evident in the Ninth Circuit's 1998 decision in Foti v. City of
Menlo Park, which found portions of the municipal code in question content based,
but applied a purpose-based test for content neutrality. See 146 F.3d 629, 636, 638
(9th Cir. 1998).
36. See, e.g., Melrose, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 613 F.3d 380, 389 (3d Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1180 (2011) (finding that a consideration of a sign's content
does not by itself make a regulation content-based); see also Rappa v. New Castle
Cnty., 18 F.3d 1043, 1047 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that a regulation may contain
content-based exceptions if the content exempted is significantly related to the partic-
ular area in which the sign is viewed because it either identifies the property on which
the sign sits or is aimed at an audience, such as motorists on a highway, that traverses
the area).
37. See, e.g., Brown v. Town of Cary, 706 F.3d 294, 304 05 (4th Cir. 2013) (find-
ing that the content on signs can be regulated so long as the distinction is not made
based on the message conveyed); Wag More Dogs, Ltd. Liability Corp. v. Cozart,
680 F.3d 359, 373 (4th Cir. 2012) (rejecting claim that code is content-based when
it requires a general inquiry into the nature of a display and the relationship to the
business on which it is displayed to determine if a display is a "business sign" rather
than a "non-business-related mural").
38. See, e.g., H.D.V.-GREEKTOWN, LLC v. City of Detroit, 568 F.3d 609, 623
(6th Cir. 2009) (rejecting an "overly narrow" interpretation of content-neutrality
and noting that nothing in the record before it indicated that the distinctions be
tween various types of signs reflected a preference for one type of speech over
another).
39. See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 651 (2012) (rejecting notion that a law is content-based merely because a
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all determined that sign codes differentiating among sign types based
on broad categories or sign function-i.e., political, real estate, con-
struction, etc.-did not contain the type of content discrimination pro-
hibited by the First Amendment. Under this "functional" or "purpo-
sive" approach to content neutrality, a sign code would be held
content based only if the local government's intent was to control con-
tent; this approach was highly favorable to government defendants.
Two other circuits, the Eighth40 and Eleventh,41 had previously
taken a more strict or "absolutist" approach to content neutrality
that demanded that sign regulations should not in any way differentiate
among signs based upon the message displayed. Under this approach,
if a code enforcement officer was required to read the message dis-
played on a sign to properly enforce the code, the sign code should
be deemed content based.42 Thus, for example, a sign code that distin-
guished between a political sign and an event sign on the basis that the
former contains a campaign message and the latter advertises a partic-
ular event would be content based and thus subject to strict scrutiny,
which would likely prove constitutionally fatal.43 The lone dissenting
Ninth Circuit judge argued, in line with these decisions, that "Gilbert's
sign ordinance plainly favors certain categories of non-commercial
speech (political and ideological signs) over others (signs promoting
events sponsored by non-profit organizations) based solely on the con-
tent of the message being conveyed."
44
The federal appeals courts were not alone in their confusion regard-
ing the meaning of content neutrality as applied in the context of sign
court must look at the content of an oral or written statement o determine if the law
applies).
40. See, e.g., Neighborhood Enters., Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 644 F.3d 728 (8th Cir.
2011) (Neighborhood Enters., Inc. II), cert. denied, City of St. Louis v. Neighborhood
Enterprises, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1543 (2012), (quoting Whitton v. City of Gladstone, 54
F.3d 1400, 1403 04 (8th Cir. 2011) and citing City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Net-
work, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993)), finding that a code exemption for any sign dis-
play meeting the definition of a "mural" was impermissibly content-based because
"the message conveyed etermines whether the speech is subject to the restriction."
Neighborhood Enters., Inc., 644 F.3d at 736.
41. See, e.g., Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250, 1267 (11th
Cir. 2005) (finding exemptions from sign code based on content rather than the time,
place, or manner-of the message discriminates against certain ypes of speech based
on content and thus are content-based).
42. For this reason, the strict approach has often been called the "need to read" ap-
proach. See Connolly supra note 34, at 201.
43. This mechanical sequence for eviewing speech regulations was clearly identi-
fied by Justice O'Connor in her concurrence in Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 59 (1994) (O'Con-
nor, J., concurring), and, prior to Reed, had been utilized by most courts reviewing
challenges to sign regulations.
44. Reed, 707 F.3d at 1080 (Watford, J., dissenting).
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codes. Beginning over forty years ago, the Supreme Court began de-
veloping two separate lines of cases regarding content neutrality.
One approach took a rather simplistic yet strict view of the doctrine,
while the other advocated a more functional approach that better ac-
commodated government regulations of speech. The strict approach
originated with the Court's first express announcement of the content
neutrality doctrine in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, de-
cided in 1972, where the Court stated, "above all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expres-
sion because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its con-
tent."45 In making that declaration, the Court invalidated a Chicago or-
dinance which prohibited all picketing in areas near schools but
exempted "peaceful abor picketing" from the general ban.46 Nine
years later, in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, the Court struck
down a municipal ordinance that distinguished between forms of non-
commercial speech displayed on billboards, and in doing so made sim-
ilarly sweeping statements regarding content neutrality.47 And in
1984, in Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vin-
cent, the Court suggested in dicta that differential treatment of politi-
cal speech, as compared with other types of noncommercial speech,
could have potentially created content neutrality problems for an oth-
erwise content neutral ordinance banning the posting of private signs
on light posts in the public right-of-way.48 These cases all stated or
implied that categorization of speech on the basis of even broad sub-
ject matter should be condemned under the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Mosley, Metromedia, and Tax-
payers for Vincent contrasted with another line of Supreme Court
45. 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). The inherent problem with the Chicago ordinance was,
for example, that labor advocates could engage in picketing outside of schools while
civil rights advocates or Vietnam War protestors could not do so. Id.
46. Id. at 94.
47. 453 U.S. 490, 515 (1981) ("With respect to noncommercial speech, the city
may not choose the appropriate subjects for public discourse: 'To allow a government
the choice of permissible subjects for public debate would be to allow that government
control over the search for political truth.' ") (internal citations omitted). The San
Diego ordinance in question exempted from the ban, "government signs; signs located
at public bus stops; signs manufactured, transported, or stored within the city, if not
used for advertising purposes; commemorative historical plaques; religious symbols;
signs within shopping malls; for sale and for lease signs; signs on public and commer-
cial vehicles; signs depicting time, temperature, and news; approved temporary, off-
premises, subdivision directional signs; and '[t]emporary political campaign signs.'"
Id. at 494-95.
48. 466 U.S. 789, 816 (1984) (noting that a "political speech" exception to a gen-
eral ban which did not apply equally to other forms of noncommercial speech could be
problematic under the content neutrality doctrine).
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cases focusing on the government's stated purpose for the challenged
regulation. Ward v. Rock Against Racism,49 decided in 1989, is one of
the leading cases adopting this approach. In Ward, the Court upheld a
requirement that performers using a public bandshell utilize municipal
sound amplification equipment and personnel for their performances.
The regulation was intended to control noise emanating from the band-
shell.50 In finding the regulation content neutral, the Court stated,
The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally
and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the government has
adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it con-
veys. The government's purpose is the controlling consideration. A regulation
that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral,
even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others. Gov-
ernment regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is "justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech."5 1
The Court's focus on governmental purpose as the determinant of
whether a regulation is content neutral is also evident in the line of
cases addressing governmental regulation of protest activities near
abortion clinics. In Hill v. Colorado,52 the Court upheld a state law
which made it "unlawful within . . . regulated areas for any person
to 'knowingly approach' within eight feet of another person, without
that person's consent, 'for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill
to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or coun-
seling with such other person.' "51 In so doing, the Court specifically
rejected the absolutist approach while noting the proliferation of
laws requiring enforcement officials to review communicative content
in order to determine the law's applicability to that content.54 The ap-
proach adopted by Ward and Hill, cited frequently by courts adopting
the functional approach advocated in Reed, differs substantially from
the approach advocated by Mosley and its progeny.
The Court's most immediate pre-Reed statement on content neutral-
ity appeared to continue the Ward-Hill purposive approach to content
49. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
50. Id. at 787.
51. Id. at 791 (internal citations omitted).
52. 530 U.S. 703, 735 (2000).
53. Id. at 707 (citing COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-9-122(3) (1999)). The Colorado statute
at issue in Hill was emblematic of laws enacted by state and local governments to limit
the extent to which protesters could inhibit access to abortion clinics. Judges have
noted the unique political dynamics involved in the abortion clinic cases. Id. at 741
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
54. See id. at 721 22 ("[W]e have never suggested that the kind of cursory exam-
ination that might be required to exclude casual conversation from the coverage of a
regulation of picketing would be problematic.").
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neutrality. In its 2014 ruling in McCullen v. Coakley, the Court inval-
idated a Massachusetts law prohibiting certain expressive activities
within a specified distance of a "reproductive health care facility"-
abortion clinics were at the center of the law's purview-but not be-
fore a majority of the Court found the law to be content neutral.
55
While acknowledging that the law in question had a differential effect
on speech surrounding abortion clinics, Chief Justice Roberts, writing
for the majority, found that "a facially neutral law does not become
content based simply because it may disproportionately affect speech
on certain topics."56 Moreover, the Court repeated the Ward test for
determining content neutrality, and in finding the Massachusetts law
content neutral, relied on the law's stated intent to advance the inter-
ests of public safety, access to health care, and unobstructed use of
public sidewalks and roads.57 The approach to content neutrality set
forth in McCullen v. Coakley continued the more lenient approach
to content neutrality in sign cases that favored local governments
and appeared to reject the more plaintiff-friendly strict approach be-
ginning with Mosley.
Recognizing this split among the courts of appeals, and perhaps in
recognition of the inconsistencies in its own doctrine, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari review in Reed.58 In the Supreme Court's
Reed decision, all nine justices agreed that the town's sign code was
unconstitutional, but differed as to why that was so.
D. Majority Opinion
The Reed majority opinion was authored by Justice Thomas and joined
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Alito and
Sotomayor. While not explicitly acknowledging the circuit split, the
Court resolved it in favor of the absolutist "need to read" position: a
sign regulation that "on its face" considers the message on a sign to
determine how it will be regulated is content based.59 As the Court
said, the "common sense meaning of the phrase 'content based' re-
quires a court to consider whether a regulation of speech 'on its
face' draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys."
60
55. 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2531 (2014).
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226 (citing the Court's decision to grant certiorari,
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 134 S. Ct. 2900 (2014)).
59. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227.
60. Id.
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Thus, if a sign code makes any distinctions based on the message of
the speech, the sign code is content based. Further, the majority
held that regulations of speech must be both facially content neutral
and content neutral in their purpose.6 According to the majority,
only after determining whether a sign code is neutral on its face should
a court inquire as to whether the law is neutral in its justification.
62
Justice Thomas's opinion dismissed several theories the Ninth Cir-
cuit majority had offered to justify its viewing the Gilbert code as con-
tent neutral. The first theory claimed that a sign regulation is content
neutral so long as it was not adopted based on disagreement with the
message conveyed and the justification for the regulation was "unre-
lated to the content of the sign."63 Justice Thomas refuted that theory
on the ground that it "skips the crucial first step in the content-
neutrality analysis: determining whether the law is content-neutral
on its face."64 Indeed, the majority opinion expresses concern about
the possibility that government officials might explicitly justify regu-
lations or actions in content neutral terms, while still writing such reg-
ulations or taking such actions with an underlying censorial motive.
65
His opinion states: "A law that is content based on its face is subject to
strict scrutiny regardless of the government's benign motive, content
neutral justification, or lack of 'animus towards the ideas contained'
in the regulated speech."
66
Next, the Court majority addressed the Ninth Circuit's finding that
the Gilbert code was content neutral "because it 'does not mention any
idea or viewpoint, let alone single one out for differential treat-
ment.' "67 Justice Thomas dismissed that finding, recognizing that it
conflated two distinct First Amendment limits on regulation of
speech-government discrimination among viewpoints and govern-
ment discrimination as to content-and noting that "a speech regula-
tion targeted at specific subject matter is content based even if it does
not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject matter."
68
61. See id. at 2222.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 2226 (citing Reed, 707 F.3d at 1071-72).
64. Id. at 2222.
65. Id. at 2228. "Innocent motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship pre-
sented by a facially content-based statute, as future government officials may one
day wield such statutes to suppress disfavored speech. That is why the First Amend-
ment expressly targets the operation of the laws i.e., the 'abridg[ement] of speech'
rather than merely the motives of those who enacted them." Id.
66. Id. at 2228 (citing Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 429).
67. Id. at 2229 (quoting Reed 1, 587 F.3d at 977).
68. Id. at 2229 30.
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Finally, the Court majority addressed the Ninth Circuit's statement
that the Gilbert code was content neutral because it made distinctions
based on "the content-neutral elements of who is speaking through the
sign and whether and when an event is occurring.'"69 After noting that
this claim was factually incorrect,0 Justice Thomas argued that the
claim was legally incorrect as well. The problem with "speaker-
based" distinctions, in the majority's view, is that they "are all too
often simply a means to control content."'" Thus, because laws con-
taining a speaker preference may reflect a content preference, they
must be subject to strict scrutiny.
7 2
In response to the finding that "event-based" distinctions were con-
tent neutral-a "novel theory," according to Justice Thomas-the ma-
jority found that "[a] regulation that targets a sign because it conveys
an idea about a specific event is no less content based than a regulation
that targets a sign because it conveys some other idea."713 Acknowl-
edging that a sign code that made event based distinctions may be
"a perfectly rational way to regulate signs," the majority stated that
"a clear and firm rule governing content neutrality is an essential
means of protecting the freedom of speech, even if laws that might
seem 'entirely reasonable' will sometimes be 'struck down because
69. Id. at 2230 (quoting Reed I, 707 F.3d at 1069).
70. Id. at 2230 31. Justice Thomas noted that the code was not speaker-based be-
cause the restrictions for ideological, political and temporary event signs applied
equally regardless of who sponsored the signs. He then argued that the code was
not "event based" because citizens could not put up a sign on any topic prior to an
election, but rather were limited to signs that were judged to have "political" or "ideo-
logical" content. Because those provisions were content-based on their face, they
could not escape strict scrutiny merely because an event, such as an election, was in-
volved. Id.
71. Id. at 2230 (quoting Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310
(2010)).
72. The authors of this article struggled to understand the Court's statement that
"we have insisted that 'laws favoring some speakers over others demand strict scrutiny
when the legislature's speaker preference reflects a content preference,'" Reed, 135
S. Ct. at 2230 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 658 (1994)). It is
not clear from the Court's statement whether the majority believes that all speaker-
based regulations should be subject to strict scrutiny, or if there is an interim analysis
that must occur in order to determine that the "legislature' s speaker preference r flects
a content preference." Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2224. We note that the Court, in Turner
Broadcasting, stated expressly that not "all speaker-partial laws are presumed in-
valid," and indeed, the Court rejected an argument that a speaker based law should
be subjected to strict scrutiny. Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 658. Neither Turner
Broadcasting nor Reed provides any useful guidance as to what indicators might be
used to determine that the legislature's speaker preference reflects a content prefer-
ence. See infra Section II.F.
73. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2231.
FALL 2015
SIGN REGULATION AFTER REED 581
of their content-based nature.' "4 This discussion of event based sig-
nage concentrated on the Gilbert code's allowance for signs with po-
litical messages only before and during election periods, and the
code's prescribed language for other event based signage;7 5 however,
the opinion is not limited to that circumstance. For example, a sign
code allowing a temporary sign with the message "Grand Opening"
but prohibiting one with any other message (e.g., "Going Out of Busi-
ness") could be seen as event based and thus content based.
Having found the challenged provisions of the Gilbert code to be
content based, Justice Thomas next addressed whether the town
could satisfy strict scrutiny, that is, demonstrating that its distinctions
among the various types of signs furthered a compelling governmental
interest and was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. According
to the majority, it could not.
7 6
The majority opinion concluded by briefly noting that the town's
"current Code regulates many aspects of signs that have nothing to
do with a sign's message,"77 and that the town had failed to tailor
its regulations to the regulatory interests-traffic safety and
aesthetics-identified in the code.7 8 The majority did note, indeed
somewhat curiously, that a sign ordinance that was narrowly tailored
to allow certain signs that "may be essential, both for vehicles and pe-
destrians, to guide traffic or to identify hazards and ensure safety" well
might survive strict scrutiny.79 The majority opinion did not address
whether the town's asserted governmental interests-traffic safety
and aesthetics-constitute compelling governmental interests for pur-
poses of strict scrutiny analysis.
80
Thus, because Gilbert's sign code differentiated "on its face" be-
tween political, ideological, and event signs based on the message
of the sign, the code was found content based. Upon making that find-
ing, the majority applied strict scrutiny, the most demanding form of
74. Id. at 2231 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 60.
75. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2231.
76. Id. at 2231-32. The town claimed the distinctions served interests in aesthetics
and traffic safety. Justice Thomas assumed for the sake of argument that these are
compelling interests, but found that the code's distinctions were underinclusive and
thus not narrowly tailored. Id.
77. Id. at 2232 (noting, as examples, regulating "size, building materials, lighting,
moving parts and portability.").
78. Id. at 2231 ("The Town cannot claim that placing strict limits on temporary di-
rectional signs is necessary to beautify the Town while at the same time allowing un-
limited numbers of other types of signs that create the same problem.").
79. Id. at 2232.
80. Id. at 2231.
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constitutional review, requiring the government to show that "the re-
striction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest. "81 As exemplified by Reed, regulations subjected
to strict scrutiny rarely survive a court's review. Because the code
placed strict limits on temporary event signs but more freely allowed
ideological signs-despite the fact that both sign types have the same
effect on traffic safety and community aesthetics-the code failed the
narrow tailoring requirement.
E. Concurrences
Three concurring opinions were filed in the case. Justice Alito filed a
concurrence, joined by Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor, in which he
agreed with the majority's ruling, but listed nine forms of sign regula-
tion that he would find content neutral. In two concurring opinions,
one by Justice Breyer and the other by Justice Kagan, three justices
concurred in the judgment but disagreed with the majority's applica-
tion of strict scrutiny to the Gilbert code.
Justice Alito's opinion further identified the regulations that, in his
view, should be considered content neutral. While disclaiming he was
providing "anything like a comprehensive list," Justice Alito noted
"some rules that would not be content based.",8 2 These included:
Rules regulating the size of signs. These rules may distinguish among signs based
on any content-neutral criteria, including any relevant criteria listed below.
Rules regulating the locations in which signs may be placed. These rules may dis-
tinguish between free-standing signs and those attached to buildings.
Rules distinguishing between lighted and unlighted signs.
Rules distinguishing between signs with fixed messages and electronic signs with
messages that change.
Rules that distinguish between the placement of signs on private and public
property.
Rules distinguishing between the placement of signs on commercial and residential
property.
Rules distinguishing between on-premises and off-premises signs.
Rules restricting the total number of signs allowed per mile of roadway.
Rules imposing time restrictions on signs advertising a one-time event. Rules of this
nature do not discriminate based on topic or subject and are akin to rules restricting
the times within which oral speech or music is allowed.8 3
81. Id. (citation omitted).
82. Id. at 2233 (Alito, J., concurring).
83. Id.
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Justice Alito further noted that "government entities may also erect
their own signs consistent with the principles that allow government
speech' 84 and claimed that "[p]roperly understood, today's decision
will not prevent cities from regulating signs in a way that fully protects
public safety and serves legitimate esthetic objectives."
' 85
In his list of acceptable sign regulations, Justice Alito approved of
two rules that may conflict with Justice Thomas's "on its face" lan-
guage. Alito claimed that rules "distinguishing between on-premises
and off-premises signs" and rules "imposing time restrictions on
signs advertising a one-time event" would be content-neutral.86 But
rules regarding "signs advertising a one-time event" clearly are fa-
cially content-based, as Justice Kagan noted in her opinion concurring
in the judgment,87 and the same claim could be made regarding the
distinction between onsite and offsite message commonly seen in
local sign codes and state highway advertising laws.88 Neither Justice
Thomas nor Justice Alito discussed how courts should treat codes that
distinguish between commercial and non-commercial signs, a point
raised by Justice Breyer in his opinion concurring in the judgment.89
Justices Breyer and Kagan, while concurring in the judgment, wrote
opinions critical of Justice Thomas's absolute rule about content-
neutrality. Justice Breyer argued that because "[t]he First Amendment
requires greater judicial sensitivity both to the Amendment's expres-
sive objectives and to the public's legitimate need for regulation
than a simple recitation of categories, such as 'content discrimination'
and 'strict scrutiny' would permit."90 While acknowledging that strict
scrutiny "sometimes makes perfect sense," he argued that regulations
that engage in content discrimination "cannot and should not always
84. Id. at 2233 (arguing that this included "all manner of signs to promote safety, as
well as directional signs and signs pointing out historic sites and scenic spots.").
85. Id. at 2233-34.
86. Id. at 2233. On-site, also called "on-premises," signage generally refers to sign-
age where the message relates to an activity occurring on the same premises as the
sign, whereas off-site or off-premises signage refers to signage advertising an activity
not located on a common property with the sign. As we discuss in greater detail in
Part I.C, the onsite-offsite distinction with respect to commercial speech was upheld
in Metromedia v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 511-12 (1981), even though the
Court rejected the notion that onsite commercial speech could be permitted to the ex-
clusion of necessarily offsite noncommercial speech. Id. at 513.
87. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2237, n.* (Kagan, J., concurring). This is, of course, only the
case if the code defines event based signage as the Gilbert code did.
88. See discussion infra Part I.C.
89. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2235.
90. Id. at 2234 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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trigger strict scrutiny."9 ' He also expressed concern that courts, forced
to apply strict scrutiny "to all sorts of justifiable government regula-
tions," might water down the approach in a way that "will weaken
the First Amendment's protection in instances where 'strict scrutiny'
should apply in full force." '9 2 In his view, the "better approach is to
generally treat content discrimination as a strong reason weighing
against the constitutionality of a rule where a traditional public
forum, or where viewpoint discrimination, is threatened, but elsewhere
treat it as a rule of thumb, finding it a helpful, but not determinative
legal tool, in an appropriate case, to determine the strength of the jus-
tification." '93 Justice Breyer would "use content discrimination as a
supplement to a more basic analysis, which, tracking most of [the
Court's] First Amendment cases, asks whether the regulation at
issue works harm to First Amendment interests that is disproportionate
in light of the relevant regulatory objectives."'9 4 To illustrate his
concern regarding the application of strict scrutiny to all content
based laws, Justice Breyer lists several laws-federal securities regu-
lations, federal energy consumption labeling requirements, prescrip-
tion drug labeling, doctor-patient confidentiality laws, and income
tax statement disclosure laws-which contain certain elements of con-
tent regulation and which might be suspect under the majority's
sweeping statements. 
95
Justice Kagan's opinion, joined by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg,
expressed great concern that the majority's absolute rule would, as
Justice Thomas himself acknowledged, lead to "entirely reasonable"
sign laws being struck down.9 6 In Justice Kagan's view, there was
no need for the majority to discuss strict scrutiny at all because the
code provisions at issue did not pass "intermediate scrutiny, or even
91. Id. at 2235. Justice Breyer's opinion did not acknowledge that its approach
not requiring strict scrutiny for content based laws conflicts with the broadly-
accepted rule that content based laws should be subject to strict scrutiny analysis.
See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014); Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 59
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The normal inquiry that our doctrine dictates is, first,
to determine whether a regulation is content based or content neutral, and then,
based on the answer to that question, to apply the proper level of scrutiny."). Id.
92. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2235 (Breyer, J., concurring).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2235-36. Justice Breyer explained that answering that question "requires
examining the seriousness of the harm to speech, the importance of the countervailing
objectives, the extent to which the law will achieve those objectives, and whether
there are other, less restrictive ways of doing so." Id. at 2236.
95. Id. at 2235.
96. Id. at 2236 (Kagan, J., concurring) (citing Thomas, J., at 2231 32).
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the laugh test."97 More basically, she argues that strict scrutiny of
many content based provisions in sign regulations is not needed be-
cause such provisions do not implicate the core First Amendment con-
cerns that justify the application of strict scrutiny.98 Justices Breyer
and Kagan would each have applied intermediate scrutiny, a less de-
manding constitutional standard that requires the government to dem-
onstrate that a speech regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve a sig-
nificant (as opposed to compelling) governmental interest9 9 and leaves
open ample alternative avenues of communication. Both Justices
Breyer and Kagan found the Gilbert sign code unconstitutional, how-
ever, because its sign categories were not tailored to the code's stated
regulatory purposes. As the majority found, the distinctions between
temporary event signs, political signs, and ideological signs did noth-
ing to further the government's goal of beautifying the community and
reducing traffic hazards.
F. Clarifying Elements of the Decision
Reed provides four points of clarification. First, the decision reaf-
firmed the principle that content based regulations are subject to strict
scrutiny and presumptively unconstitutional. To the chagrin of Justices
Breyer and Kagan, the Reed majority applied a now-familiar mechan-
ical approach to content neutrality analysis in which the Court first de-
termined whether the law was content based.'00 Finding that the law
was content based,'0 ' the Reed Court then proceeded to apply strict
scrutiny, requiring the town to prove that its sign code "furthers a com-
pelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to that end."'0 2
This mechanical approach, first articulated in Justice O'Connor's
97. Id. at 2239. There is some support for the argument that the Court's entire dis-
cussion of content neutrality in the Reed majority opinion is dicta, given that the ma-
jority and the concurrences come out in the same place: that the Gilbert code failed the
narrowly-tailored requirement of both intermediate and strict scrutiny. See McCutch-
eon v. Federal Election Comm'n, 572 U.S. _, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1446 (2014). In
McCullen v. Coakley, Justice Scalia's concurrence chided the majority opinion, au-
thored by Chief Justice Roberts, for undertaking the content neutrality analysis
when the decision ultimately concluded that the Massachusetts law was not narrowly
tailored. 134 S. Ct. at 2541-42 (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring to the Court's discus-
sion of content neutrality as "seven pages of the purest dicta.").
98. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2237 (Kagan, J., concurring).
99. See, e.g., Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789, 807 (1984). Traffic safety and aesthetics, for example, are significant
governmental interests. Id. at 807.
100. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226-27.
101. Id. at 2227.
102. Id. at 2231.
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concurring opinion in Gilleo,10 3 was carried forward by the majority in
McCullen,10 4 and now appears to be the conclusive method for analyz-
ing speech regulations for content neutrality purposes, although ques-
tions remain about its application to regulation of offsite signs and
adult entertainment businesses.'
0 5
Second, the majority opinion resolved the prior split between the
circuit courts of appeal by requiring both facial content neutrality
and a neutral purpose for sign regulations, and determined that a reg-
ulation's purpose is irrelevant if the regulation is not neutral on its
face. The majority opinion in Reed calls into question hundreds of
lower court decisions that relied on the Court's statements in Ward
and Hill in upholding municipal sign regulations that regulated signs
according to category or function but which relied upon clearly-
articulated content neutral purpose statements and justifications in so
doing.' 06 At the same time, the Reed decision affirms the lower courts
that took the strict or absolutist view of content neutrality and that
placed less reliance on governmental purpose in favor of scrutinizing
the facial neutrality of sign regulations. Courts are now required to un-
dertake a two-step content neutrality analysis to review speech regula-
tions for both facial neutrality and purposive neutrality.
Third, the Court determined that categorical signs, such as directional
signs, real estate signs, construction signs, etc., are content based where
they are defined by aspects of the signs' message. Many local sign codes
currently define these signs by reference to the content of the sign. For
example, "real estate sign" might be defined as "a sign advertising for
sale the property on which the sign is located." Similarly, local codes
have often regulated each of these sign types differently, even if the
code's stated or implied purpose in doing so was merely a recognition
of the different functions of, and thus need for, these types of signs. To
the extent local codes define these signs according to the message stated
on the face of the sign, Reed concludes that such regulations are pre-
sumptively unconstitutional. As we discuss below, however, there
may be several options for egulating these signs in a content neutral
manner.
Fourth, the Court stated that regulations purporting to be "speaker
based," that is, the regulation applies to certain speakers but not others,
103. See 512 U.S. at 59 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
104. See 134 S. Ct. at 2530.
105. See discussion infra Sections II.C. & II.E.
106. See Cahaly v. Larosa, F.3d , 2015 WL 4646922, at *4 (4th Cir. 2015).
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may be found content based and subjected to strict scrutiny. That is,
regulations that distinguish between speakers are neither by necessity
content neutral, nor are they automatically excused from content neu-
trality analysis, although they may be permissible. First Amendment
doctrine regarding speaker based regulation is incredibly murky, so
while the Reed majority's statements on the matter may provide
some clarification, questions regarding speaker based regulation re-
main and are discussed further below.
As for unanswered questions following Reed, there are many and
we explore them in the following section.
II. Remaining Questions After Reed
While there are four points of clarification following Reed, there are
several questions that arise as a result of the decision. As we have au-
thored this article in the immediate aftermath of the decision, our list
of questions represents he authors' initial reactions to some of the is-
sues raised by the decision.
A. Regulations of Speech by Category and Function:
Where Do They Stand?
One of the most immediate questions following Reed is whether reg-
ulation of signs by category or function continues to be permissible.
Virtually all local sign codes contain some element of categorical or
functional sign regulation that, if rendered unconstitutional by Reed,
could potentially give rise to constitutional liability.
Take, for example, real estate signs.'7 As noted above, many local
codes define real estate signs by the message on the sign, i.e., "[s]igns
that identify or advertise the sale, lease or rental of a particular struc-
ture or land area."'0 8 This definition clearly identifies and defines the
sign by the message on the face of the sign, in turn requiring a local
code enforcement officer to read the message of the sign and to deter-
mine that the sign's message is, first, advertising; second, discussing
the property on which it is located; and third, regarding the sale of
107. This example assumes, without argument, that real estate signs are noncom-
mercial and that regulation and enforcement of such signs is subject to the content
neutrality analysis. This example further assumes that he speaker posting the sign
has a First Amendment interest on par with, say, an owner of a sign advocating for
an election issue. There is certainly a persuasive argument that any real estate sign
is commercial speech, however, real estate signs posted in residential districts are at
times treated differently.
108. See, e.g., DENVER, COLO., ZONING CODE § 10.10.3.1.G (2015); AMARILLo, TEX.,
SIGN ORDINANCE § 4-2-2 (2015).
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that particular property. Under the Reed majority's treatment of fa-
cially content based laws, such a regulation would be subject to strict
scrutiny and presumptively unconstitutional.09 Similar problems exist
for local code definitions of construction signs ("a sign advertising the
project being constructed and stating the name and address of the con-
tractor")," 0 directional signs ("a sign located within ten feet of a drive-
way entrance, containing words, arrows, or other symbols directing
motorists into the driveway entrance"),"' and grand opening signs ("a
temporary sign advertising the opening or reopening of a busi-
ness"),1 2 to name a few.
With all of these functional or categorical sign regulations poten-
tially unconstitutional after Reed, what is a local government to do?
An alternative approach in the case of real estate signs could be to de-
fine "real estate sign" as "a temporary sign placed on property which is
actively marketed for sale, as the same may be evidenced by the prop-
erty's listing in a multiple listing service." Such a definition does not
contain the same type of content problems that the prior definition had,
and appears to define the sign not by the content of the message, but
rather by the status of the property, i.e., whether it is actively marketed
for sale. Even so, the Reed majority might find such a regulation to fail
the content neutrality test, since Reed expresses concern about code
provisions that define speech "by its function or purpose.""' 3 There-
fore, the status and constitutionality of sign regulations relating to
so-called functional signs is an open question after Reed. 114 We dis-
cuss some of the regulatory issues associated with this problem below.
109. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227.
110. See, e.g., SANDOVAL CNTY., N.M., SIGN ORDINANCE § 5.A (2005).
111. See, e.g., WICHITA FALLS, TEX., SIGN REGULATIONS § 6720 (2015).
112. See, e.g., KINGMAN, ARIZ., SIGN CODE § 25.200 (2015).
113. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 ("Some facial distinctions based on a message are
obvious, defining regulated speech by particular subject matter, and others are more
subtle, defining regulated speech by its function or purpose. Both are distinctions
drawn based on the message a speaker conveys, and, therefore, are subject to strict
scrutiny.").
114. In the case of real estate signs, the problem is even more complicated than for
other types of functional signs. Supreme Court precedent holds that local governments
may not prohibit property owners from posting real estate signs to advertise property
for sale, as doing so constitutes suppression of protected speech. See Linmark Assoc.,
Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96 (1977). Some other types of functional
signs, such as construction signs, grand opening signs, etc., could probably be prohib-
ited without questions as to the constitutionality of such a ban.
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B. Definitional Issues with the Term "Sign"
and Related Problems
Many sign codes contain provisions that differentiate between what is
and what is not a "sign" by reference to the content of the message
displayed and/or who is displaying the message. The code then regu-
lates "signs" and non-"signs" differently. The Reed decision calls
these provisions into question.
A recent Eighth Circuit case, Neighborhood Enterprises, Inc. v. City
of St. Louis," 5 exemplifies this issue. The code provision in question
defined the term "sign" and then listed numerous exemptions that
would not be considered to be a "sign":
Sign. "Sign" means any object or device or part thereof situated outdoors which is
used to advertise, identify, display, direct or attract attention to an object, person, in-
stitution, organization, business product, service, event, or location by any means
including words, letters, figures, designs, symbols, fixtures, colors, motion illumina-
tion or projected images. Signs do not include the following:
a. Flags of nations, states and cities, fraternal, religious and civic organization;
b. Merchandise, pictures of models of products or services incorporated in a win-
dow display;
c. Time and temperature devices;
d. National, state, religious, fraternal, professional and civic symbols or crests, or
on site ground based measure display device used to show time and subject mat-
ter of religious services;
e. Works of art which in no way identify a product.
If for any reason it cannot be readily determined whether or not an object is a sign,
the Community Development Commission shall make such determination.
1 1 6
The city's Board of Adjustment upheld the denial of a sign permit for
painted wall art critical of St. Louis's eminent domain practices. The ap-
plicant sued, claiming that what the city termed a "sign" was actually a
"mural" exempt from the city's sign regulations."7 The district court
granted summary judgment to the city." 8 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit
noted that objects of the same dimension as the sign-or "mural"-at
issue would not be subject to the regulations if they were symbols of
certain organizations, and thus the content of the message displayed
115. See Neighborhood Enters. Inc., 644 F.3d at 728.
116. Neighborhood Enters., Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 2014 WL 5564418, at *1-2
(E.D. Mo. 2014).
117. See Neighborhood Enters., Inc., 644 F.3d at 733 34; Neighborhood Enters.,
Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 718 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. Mo. 2010).
118. Neighborhood Enters., Inc., 644 F.3d at 734.
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determined whether the object was or was not regulated as a "sign.""
9
The court found that the sign code's definition of "sign" was impermis-
sibly content-based because "the message conveyed determines whether
the speech is subject to the restriction."'20 In applying strict scrutiny, the
court stated that the city's asserted interests in traffic safety and aesthet-
ics had never been found compelling,'21 and ruled that even if these
were compelling interests, the code's treatment of exempt and non-
exempt "signs" was not narrowly-tailored to the city's asserted goals
and thus the provision was unconstitutional. 1
22
In so ruling, the Eighth Circuit followed the absolutist approach to
determining whether a code was content based, in line with what is
now required of all courts under Reed. In contrast, the ruling in
Wag More Dogs, LLC v. Cozart,123 a 2012 Fourth Circuit decision fol-
lowing the purposive approach to content neutrality, shows how such
rulings cannot stand after the Court's ruling in Reed.
Wag More Dogs was a pet daycare business in Arlington,
Virginia. 124 After the business relocated to a site opposite a popular
dog park, the owner commissioned an artist to paint a 960 square
foot artwork on the rear of building that included several of the car-
toon dogs featured in the business's logo.'2 5 Shortly after the artwork
was completed, the city cited the owner for violating the sign code by
displaying a sign that exceeded the code's size limits.' 2 6 After discus-
sions with the owner, the city offered to allow her to retain the "mural"
119. Id. at 736.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 738; see discussion infra Section II.G.
122. Neighborhood Enters., Inc., 644 F.3d at 738. Because the district court had
never considered whether the provision was severable, the Eighth Circuit remanded
the case to allow the lower court to determine whether the unconstitutional provisions
were severable from the remainder of the code. On remand, the district court found the
new sign ordinance to be content neutral, Neighborhood Enters., Inc. v. City of St.
Louis, 17 F. Supp. 3d 907 (E.D. Mo. 2014), but later vacated that finding, determining
that the definition of "sign" in the code could not be severed from the balance of the
code. Neighborhood Enters., Inc., 2014 WL 566418, at *1 (E.D. Mo. 2014).
123. 680 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2012).
124. Id. at 363.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 362-64. The sign code defined the term "sign" as "[a]ny word, numeral,
figure, design, trademark, flag, pennant, twirler, light, display, banner, balloon or other
device of any kind which, whether singly or in any combination, is used to direct,
identify, or inform the public while viewing the same from outdoors." Id. at 362. It
further provided as a general rule that "[a] sign permit shall be obtained from the Zon-
ing Administrator before any sign or advertising is erected, displayed, replaced, or al-
tered so as to change its overall dimensions." Id.
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on condition she added the words "Welcome to Shirlington Park's
Community Canine Area" above the artwork. In the city's view, the
addition of these words would convert the painting from an impermis-
sible sign into an informational sign not requiring a permit under the
sign code. The owner declined the offer and sued, claiming that the
code was impermissibly content-based both facially and as-applied. 1
27
The Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of the city, rejecting the owner's
claim that a sign ordinance differentiating based on the content of a
sign must be found content based.128 The court stressed that the
sign code's distinctions were adopted "to regulate land use, not to sty-
mie a particular disfavored message" and, thus, in the court's view
"the Sign Ordinance's content neutrality is incandescent."'
129
The Wag More Dogs approach to content neutrality in defining a
sign is, of course, no longer viable after Reed. The more crucial
point, however, is that the regulatory approach to defining signs
seen in both of these cases is no longer viable after Reed. The problem
with each-and with most sign codes-is not the definition of "sign"
per se, but rather the various content based exemptions or exceptions
from regulations that apply to the non-exempted signs. In both cases,
for example, the codes differentiated between signs and murals. More
generally, almost all codes require a sign permit to display a perma-
nent sign, i.e., a sign that will be displayed for a lengthy, but indefinite,
period, such as a sign on the faqade of a commercial building, but ex-
empt from the permit requirement numerous other signs defined by
their content, such as "nameplates" on residences or signs advertising
a property for sale or rent.
After Reed, such content based exceptions would be subject to strict
scrutiny. To avoid that, local governments that want to retain such ex-
emptions will need to reformulate them to be content neutral. In many
cases, such reformulation is fairly simple: although a "nameplate" sign
is content based, allowing the display of a "permanent sign no larger
than one square foot placed on the front of a residential structure, or
mounted in the front lawn of a residential property, or... etc." is con-
tent neutral. We explore this approach further in Section III.E.
127. Id. at 364.
128. See id. at 366-67.
129. Id. at 368.
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C. Continued Validity of the On-premises!
Off-premises Distinction
Reed also creates some uncertainty about whether a sign code provi-
sion distinguishing between on-site and off-site signs should be
considered a content-based regulation. The provision challenged in
Reed applied only to temporary non-commercial signs. Justice Tho-
mas's majority opinion did not discuss regulation of on-site versus
off-site signs, but that issue was addressed, albeit peremptorily, in Jus-
tice Alito's concurrence.'30 The extent to which the two opinions con-
flict regarding whether a sign code provision that distinguishes
between on-site and off-site signs is unclear.
Historically, judges, lawyers and sign owners have disagreed on
whether the distinction between on- and off-site signs discriminates
on the basis of content, or if it is simply a content neutral regulation
of a sign's location.'3 1 On one hand, the distinction turns on the loca-
tion of a sign-a clearly content neutral method of sign regulation,
even after Reed.132 On the other hand, this distinction clearly relies
upon the message displayed, for example, by defining an on-site
sign as one that displays a message concerning products or services
offered for sale, rental, or use on the premises where the sign is
located.1
33
With respect to regulations of commercial speech, the Supreme
Court conclusively determined in Metromedia that the distinction be-
tween on- and off-site signs was permissible, subject to certain limita-
tions.134 The on-site/off-site distinction is more complicated, however,
relative to noncommercial speech. Since noncommercial signage, such
as a political advertisement or religious proclamation, rarely has a
locational component, it is almost always off-premises in a literal
sense. For example, a restaurant owner who displays a sign reading
"Barack Obama for President" is not advertising or otherwise calling
attention to any activity on the premises where the sign is located.
130. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2233 (Alito, J., concurring).
131. Compare Metromedia Inc., 453 U.S. at 511-12 (upholding on-premises/off-
premises distinction as it relates to commercial speech) with Outdoor Media Dimen-
sions, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 132 P.3d 5, 16-17 (Or. 2006) (finding on-premises/off-
premises distinction to be content-based under state constitution).
132. See, e.g., Contest Promotions, LLC v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 2015
WL 4571564, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ("The distinction between primary versus non-
primary activities is fundamentally concerned with the location of the sign relative to
the location of the product which it advertises.").
133. See, e.g., SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 28-6 (2015).
134. Metromedia Inc., 453 U.S. at 511-12.
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Thus, a sign code prohibiting all off-site signage would ban a fair
amount of noncommercial speech. The Supreme Court recognized
this problem in Metromedia, and established a rule that the govern-
ment cannot favor commercial over noncommercial speech through,
for example, complete bans on off-premises signage without provision
for off-premises noncommercial copy.' 35 Under the holding in Metro-
media, it follows that the on-premises/off-premises distinction is only
available for commercial signs, and should be avoided for noncom-
mercial signage.
Under a literal reading of Justice Thomas's majority opinion in
Reed, the on-premises/off-premises distinction is probably content
based "on its face" because it is the content of the message displayed
that determines whether a sign should be classified as on-site or off-
site. 136 But Justice Alito's concurring opinion included "[r]ules distin-
guishing between on-premises and off-premises signs" among a list of
,.some rules that would not be content-based."'137 It follows that Justice
Alito likely views the on-premises/off-premises distinction as simply
regulating signs' location. All of the foregoing suggests that a chal-
lenge to sign code exemptions for non-commercial, off-site signs
from bans on off-site signs should still be judged by applying the
lower level of scrutiny under the Central Hudson four-part test
138
for regulations of commercial speech, similar to Metromedia. 139 If we as-
sume without argument that Reed addresses only noncommercial sign
regulations and has no bearing on regulations of commercial signs-a
big assumption that is discussed further below-the on-premises/off-
premises distinction remains unaffected by Reed.
These suggestions are strongly reinforced by the doctrine that prior
Supreme Court decisions should not be overruled by implication. As
the Court reaffirmed in Agostini v. Felton: "[I]f a precedent of this
Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons
rejected in some other line of decisions, the [lower courts] should
135. See id. at 513.
136. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227.
137. Id. at 2233 (Alito, J., concurring).
138. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980) (determining the constitutionality of a regulation of commercial
speech by applying a four-part test: (1) to be protected, the speech (a) must concern
lawful activity and (b) must not be false or misleading; if the speech is protected,
then the regulation must: (2) serve a substantial governmental interest; (3) directly ad-
vance the asserted governmental interest; and (4) be no more extensive than necessary
to serve that interest).
139. See Metromedia Inc., 453 U.S. at 507 (1981) (applying the four-part test from
Central Hudson).
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follow the case which directly controls, leaving to [the Supreme]
Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions."'40 Thus, de-
spite the fact that Justice Thomas's "on its face" rule for determining
whether a code is content based conflicts with the Metromedia court's
ruling that the on-site/off-site distinction should be treated as content
neutral (and, as discussed below, may conflict with the commercial/
noncommercial distinction), because Reed did not expressly overrule
Metromedia, the latter remains good precedent on that point.
Of course, the above discussion leaves open the question of whether
the Court would overturn Metromedia if the opportunity arose. If that
question were presented to the Court as presently constituted, i.e., the
same justices who decided Reed, the answer appears to be "no" by at
least a 6-3 vote. Justice Alito's three-justice concurrence found that
the on-site/off-site distinction is not content-based. We then can add
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan, who concurred in the judgment
in Reed but rejected the majority's "on its face" rule,' 4 1 as three more
anticipated votes for upholding Metromedia.
As of this writing, four lower federal courts have decided post-Reed
cases involving challenges to prohibitions or restrictions applicable to
off-premises billboard advertising. Three of these courts, acknowledg-
ing Reed's applicability only to noncommercial speech, upheld the
challenged restrictions, specifically citing the rules for commercial
off-site signage established in Metromedia.14 2 One of these cases spe-
cifically observed what we have observed above: "at least six Justices
continue to believe that regulations that distinguish between on-site
and off-site signs are not content-based, and therefore do not trigger
strict scrutiny."'143 A fourth case, addressing a challenge to the Tennes-
see highway advertising act, calls several of that law's distinctions into
question, including the on-site/off-site distinction,144 seemingly ignor-
ing Justice Alito's concurrence as it relates to the on-premises/off-
140. 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (quoting Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)).
141. See, e.g., Contest Promotions, LLC, 2015 WL 4571564, at *4 (concluding that
"at least six Justices continue to believe that regulations that distinguish between on-
site and off-site signs are not content-based, and therefore do not trigger strict
scrutiny.").
142. See id.; Citizens for Free Speech, LLC v. Cnty. of Alameda, - F. Supp. 3d
2015 WL 4365439, at *13 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Calif. Outdoor Equity Partners v.
City of Corona, 2015 WL 4163346, at *10 (C.D. Cal. 2015) ("Reed does not concern
commercial speech, let alone bans on off-site billboards.").
143. Contest Promotions LLC, 2015 WL 4571564, at *4.
144. See Thomas v. Schroer, _ F. Supp. 3d _, 2015 WL 4577084, at *4 (W.D.
Tenn. 2015).
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premises distinction. Given the divisions in the lower courts regarding
the continuing validity of the on-premises/off-premises distinction, we
can only assume that Reed has created an open question on this issue
that may take years to resolve.
D. Regulation of Commercial Speech
What does Reed mean for commercial speech regulation? Technically,
Reed applies only to noncommercial speech, the regulation of which
has historically been subjected to a more exacting standard of review
than commercial speech regulations, but some of the references in
Reed point to cases that reviewed commercial speech regulations. Spe-
cifically, Reed cites extensively to Sorrell v. IMS Health,145 which
some First Amendment observers saw as limiting-if not gutting-
the commercial speech doctrine in favor of a uniform approach to
reviewing commercial and noncommercial speech regulations. 1
46
Sorrell was a 2011 case involving a challenge by pharmaceutical
companies and other individuals to a Vermont law restricting the sale,
disclosure or use of pharmacy records to reveal the prescribing practices
of individual physicians.14 Vermont claimed that the law safeguarded
medical privacy, diminishing the likelihood that "data miners" would
compile prescription data for sale to drug manufacturers who would
then use it to tailor drug marketing to individual physicians.148 Vermont
claimed that such targeted marketing strategies would lead to prescrip-
tion decisions benefiting the drug companies to the detriment of patients
and the state.149 The plaintiff pharmaceutical manufacturers and indi-
vidual "data-miners" claimed that speech in aid of pharmaceutical mar-
keting is a form of expression protected by the First Amendment and
that the challenged law impermissibly prohibited the exercise of their
First Amendment right to free expression.
150
145. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
146. See, e.g., Nat Stem & Mark Joseph Stern, Advancing an Adaptive Standard of
Strict Scrutiny for Content-Based Commercial Speech Regulation, 47 U. RiCH. L. R~v.
1171, 1171 (2013) (referring to Sorrell as having "marked the most recent step in the
gradual elevation of commercial speech from 'its subordinate position in the scale of
First Amendment values' to its status as a form of expression that routinely enjoys ro-
bust protection from the Court"); Allen Rostron, Pragmatism, Paternalism, and the
Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech, 37 VT. L. REv. 527, 553 (2013)
("[B]eneath that illusion of stability [in the commercial speech doctrine] lies tremen-
dous uncertainty. Intense debate continues about how to apply the existing tests,
whether they should be discarded, and what would replace them.").
147. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2663.
148. Id. at 2659.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court found the law in question un-
constitutional, with the "line-up" of Justices and their rationales ex-
actly mirroring Reed. Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion,
which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Tho-
mas, Alito and Sotomayor, the same majority as in Reed. Justice
Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, the same
Justices who rejected the majority's "on its face" rule in Reed and con-
curred only in the judgment. As with Reed, the Sorrell majority ap-
plied a higher degree of judicial scrutiny than the dissenting Justices
would have imposed and held the regulation unconstitutional. Sorrell
differs from Reed in that the dissenters in Sorrell would have upheld
the challenged statute under their lower standard, while the same Jus-
tices in Reed argued that the sign code was unconstitutional under
their lower standard.
Given the parallels between Sorrell and Reed-and the Reed major-
ity's extensive reliance on the Sorrell majority opinion-what effect
might these cases have on the Court's future treatment of commercial
sign regulation? Two issues are worth consideration. First, the Court's
application of content neutrality review in Sorrell seems to upset prior
judicial approaches to reviewing commercial speech regulations, and
the Court's reliance on Sorrell in the Reed opinion may foreshadow
an extension of this change into the sign regulation arena. Before
Sorrell, it was generally accepted that commercial speech regulations
were not required to be content-neutral.15 1 Without rigorous analysis
or discussion, the Sorrell Court rejected Vermont's arguments that
the commercial speech doctrine and Central Hudson test should
apply to the commercial speech regulation at issue in that case.'
52
Reed's reliance on Sorrell may therefore portend a cut-back or over-
ruling of the commercial speech doctrine and Central Hudson test
with respect to sign regulation, potentially meaning that all regulations
of commercial signage would be subjected to content neutrality
analysis. 153
151. See, e.g., Metromedia Inc., 453 U.S. at 514 ("Although the city may distin-
guish between the relative value of different categories of commercial speech, the
city does not have the same range of choice in the area of noncommercial speech
to evaluate the strength of, or distinguish between, various communicative interests.").
But see N. Olmsted Chamber of Commerce v. City of N. Olmsted, 86 F.Supp.2d 755
(N.D. Ohio 2000) (holding that sign ordinance's content-based restrictions on truthful,
non-misleading commercial speech violated First Amendment).
152. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667-68.
153. For an example of a case which has apparently taken this approach, see
Thomas, - F. Supp. 3d _, 2015 WL 4577084, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. June 24,
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The second implication of Reed and Sorrell is similarly complex.
The majority in Sorrell found that the Vermont law "on its face"
imposed "content and speaker based restrictions on the sale, disclo-
sure, and use of prescriber-identifying information" that was commer-
cial speech protected under the First Amendment and imposed
"heightened"-but not strict-scrutiny.154 When these same Justices
found, in Reed, that the Gilbert code "on its face" had imposed "content-
and speaker-based restrictions" on non-commercial signs, they imposed
strict scrutiny.155 Critically, while Justice Thomas's majority opinion in
Reed cited Sorrell extensively, it never suggested that the strict scrutiny
standard, required when a regulation of non-commercial speech "on its
face" was content based, was also required when a regulation of commer-
cial speech "on its face" was content based.
That distinction is very telling because Justice Kennedy's Sorrell
opinion explicitly noted both that commercial speech raises legitimate
concerns that may require content based regulations and that commer-
cial speech can be regulated to a greater extent than non-commercial
speech: "It is true that content-based restrictions on protected expres-
sion are sometimes permissible, and that principle applies to commer-
cial speech. Indeed the government's legitimate interest in protecting
consumers from 'commercial harms' explains 'why commercial
speech can be subject to greater governmental regulation than non-
commercial speech.' "156
In light of the above, it appears that Reed does not require that
content-based regulations of commercial signs, including distinctions
between commercial and noncommercial messages, be subject to strict
scrutiny. Rather, such regulations at most would be subject to some
form of intermediate scrutiny. It may, however, be the case that Sorrell
and Reed require courts to analyze commercial sign regulations for
content bias. That said, Metromedia's rule that noncommercial signs
must be treated at least as favorably as commercial signs remains
valid, so a regulation that prefers commercial to non-commercial
signs would be struck-down. In Section III.C.2, we advise on how
to avoid inadvertently creating such preferences by adding a "substitu-
tion clause" to local sign codes.
2015) (calling into question Tennessee's highway advertising act, which prohibits off-
premises commercial advertising without a permit and exempts on-premises signage
from the permit requirement).
154. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2663.
155. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2230-31.
156. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2672 (citations omitted).
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E. Regulation of Adult Businesses
Does the Reed majority opinion have any effect on how courts should
view regulation of adult entertainment businesses? Such regulations
have long been treated as an exception to the way courts normally
treat the issue of content-neutrality. Adult entertainment business reg-
ulations distinguish such businesses from others by looking to the con-
tent of their expression, but regulate them because of concerns about
the so-called "secondary effects" associated with these businesses,
such as increases in criminal activity and neighborhood deteriora-
tion; 157 reasons that are unrelated to the content of the expression.
This "secondary effects" doctrine'58 holds that regulations of certain
types of speech, such as adult entertainment, are content neutral
when they are justified on the grounds that certain types of speech
have negative secondary effects on the surrounding community.'
59
While the doctrine arguably could be applied in contexts outside of
adult entertainment regulation, it has largely been confined to that con-
text and rejected in others.'
60
The secondary effects doctrine is at odds with both the Reed major-
ity's "on its face" rule and the concerns about limiting disfavored mes-
sages underlying that rule. On that ground it seems a likely candidate
to be revisited in the near future. But the likelihood that the Supreme
Court would overrule the secondary effects doctrine is diminished
based on the Court's decision in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda
Books, Inc.
161
Adult entertainment regulations are content-based "on their face":
such regulations apply "to particular speech because of the topic dis-
cussed or the idea or message expressed" and "draws distinctions
157. See generally Alan C. Weinstein & Richard D. McCleary, The Association of
Adult Businesses with Secondary Effects: Legal Doctrine, Social Theory, and Empir-
ical Evidence, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 565 (2011).
158. See generally Christopher Andrew, The Secondary Effects Doctrine: The His-
torical Development, Current Application, and Potential Mischaracterization of an
Elusive Judicial Precedent, 54 RUTGERS L. REv. 1175 (2002).
159. See, e.g., Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); City of Ren-
ton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); City of L.A. v. Alameda Books,
Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002) (Alameda Books).
160. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (ruling that a Washington,
D.C. ordinance barring messages critical of foreign governments within 500 feet of an
embassy could not be justified under the secondary effects doctrine because "[t]he
emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a 'secondary effect.' "). But see
Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dept. of State, 2015 WL 4658921, at *8 (W.D. Tex. 2015)
(analogizing to secondary effects doctrine in upholding a content-based restriction
in federal regulations banning the export of certain firearms).
161. See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 425.
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based on the message a speaker conveys."'6 2 Further, the rationale
for the secondary effects doctrine's treating the distinction between
"adult" and "non-adult" expression as content-neutral-that the dis-
tinction is justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech-was explicitly rejected by the majority opinion in Reed.
Reed clearly states that such an approach:
[S]kips the crucial first step in the content-neutrality analysis: determining whether
the law is content neutral on its face. A law that is content based on its face is sub-
ject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government's benign motive, content-neutral
justification, or lack of "animus toward the ideas contained in the regulated
speech.
' 163
Moreover, the secondary effects doctrine contradicts the Reed ma-
jority's rationale underlying the "on its face" rule. Explaining why
the majority rejected the claim "that a government's purpose is rele-
vant even when a law is content-based on its face," Justice Thomas
wrote:
Innocent motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship presented by a facially
content-based statute, as future government officials may one day wield such stat-
utes to suppress disfavored speech .... The vice of content-based legislation ... is
not that it is always used for invidious, thought control purposes, but that it lends
itself to use for those purposes."
1 64
Despite the secondary effects doctrine's doctrinal vulnerability
after Reed, the Court's most recent decision on adult entertainment
regulation suggests the Justices may not be eager to revisit the
issue. Moreover, the Court's doctrinal opposition to overruling
prior decisions by implication seems to weigh in favor of continued
life for the secondary effects doctrine.'65 The Court last considered
the appropriate standard of review for a challenge to an adult
entertainment regulation in Alameda Books.166 Justices Thomas
and Scalia joined Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion criticizing
162. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227.
163. Id. at 2228 (citations omitted).
164. Id. at 2228-29 (citations omitted).
165. See discussion supra notes 140-41.
166. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 425. The Court did subsequently consider a chal-
lenge to an adult entertainment business licensing scheme in City of Littleton, Colo. v.
Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774 (2004), but that decision dealt solely with the
issue of the procedures required to provide the "prompt judicial review" of licensing
decisions that had been called for in an earlier ruling, FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,
493 U.S. 215 (1990). In City of Littleton, seven Justices agreed that in the context of
adult business licensing, the "prompt judicial review" language in FW/PBS required a
prompt judicial decision, not just an assurance of prompt access to the courts. City of
Littleton, 541 U.S. at 774. See generally BRIAN W. BLAESSER & ALAN C. WEINSTEIN,
FEDERAL LAND USE LAW & LITIGATION, 548-56 (2014 ed.)
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the Ninth Circuit for imposing too high an evidentiary bar for cities
seeking merely to address the secondary effects of adult busi-
nesses,'16 but Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion reiterating
his long-standing claim that businesses engaged in "pandering sex"
are not protected under the First Amendment and that communities
may not merely regulate them with impunity, but may suppress
them entirely.' 68 Given that view, while Justice Thomas's opinion
in Reed might portend a vote to overturn the secondary effects doc-
trine and subject cities to strict scrutiny when they regulate adult
businesses, it seems unlikely that Justice Scalia would do so.
Of the remaining Justices in the Reed majority, only Justice Ken-
nedy was on the Alameda Books Court. He authored a concurring
opinion that criticized the plurality's approach because it skipped a
critical inquiry: "how speech will fare under the city's ordinance."'
169
That criticism suggests that he might also vote to overturn the second-
ary effects doctrine, but, as we note below, perhaps not.
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer were also on the Alameda Books
Court and joined Justice Souter's dissent that expressed concern
about the significant risk that courts would uphold adult entertainment
business ordinances that effectively regulate speech based on govern-
ment's distaste for the viewpoint being expressed.170 While this con-
cern suggests that Justices Ginsburg and Breyer might vote to overturn
the secondary effects doctrine, both joined Justice Kagan's opinion
concurring in the judgment in Reed, which specifically approved of
the doctrine.'7 ' Arguably, that suggests they would not vote to over-
turn the secondary effects doctrine.
167. See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 436-38.
168. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 443-44 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing City of Erie
v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 310 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) and FW/PBS, Inc.,
493 U.S. at 256-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)). The holding
in FW/PBS, Inc. was subsequently modified by City of Littleton, 541 U.S. at 774.
169. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 450 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In Justice Kenne-
dy's view, shared by Justice Souter's dissenting opinion, a "city may not assert that it
will reduce secondary effects by reducing speech in the same proportion." Id. at 449.
In short, "[t]he rationale of the ordinance must be that it will suppress secondary
effects-and not by suppressing speech." Id. at 449 50.
170. Id. at 457 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter's dissent stated:
Adult speech refers not merely to sexually explicit content, but to speech reflecting
a favorable view of being explicit about sex and a favorable view of the practices it
depicts; a restriction on adult content is thus also a restriction turning on a particular
viewpoint, of which the government may disapprove. Id.
171. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2238 (Kagan, J., concurring) (citing Renton v. Play-
time Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)) ("[A]pplying intermediate scrutiny to a
zoning law that facially distinguished among movie theaters based on content because
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Based on the above discussion, we believe that, today, only Justice
Thomas is likely interested in overturning the secondary effects doc-
trine since the doctrine raises concerns about the risk of censorship
identical to those he noted in Reed. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito might also vote to overturn, but seem far less likely to do so in
light of the doctrinal nuance shown by Chief Justice Roberts in
McCullen and Justice Alioto in Reed. Four Justices would likely not
vote to overturn: Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan and, for the reason
noted, Scalia. That leaves Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor, who were
on the same side in both Sorrell and Reed. While it is unclear how Jus-
tice Sotomayor might vote, if Justice Kennedy voted to overturn the sec-
ondary effects doctrine, his concurring opinion in Alameda Books,
which now sets the evidentiary standard for adult entertainment cases,
effectively is nullified. We suspect that he would not want to do that,
which means that the Court currently lacks the four votes needed to re-
visit the secondary effects doctrine.
F. What is Speaker-based Regulation and Where
Does Reed Leave It?
In making its finding that the Gilbert sign code was content neutral, the
Ninth Circuit's opinion relied in part on the notion that the Gilbert sign
code did not impermissibly regulate on the basis of content, but
instead validly distinguished between speakers.'7 2 That court's reli-
ance on the constitutionality of speaker-based regulation was not the
first time the Ninth Circuit had invoked the concept of speaker-
based regulation to uphold arguably facially content-based sign regu-
lations.'7 3 In Reed, the Ninth Circuit found that the temporary event
sign regulations were based in part on the party displaying the sign:
"Qualifying Event Sign" was defined in a manner that permitted
only certain nonprofit organizations and other entities to display
such signs.'7 4 In the Ninth Circuit's view, such a regulation does
not indicate any preference for a particular type of content.
it was 'designed to prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade, [and] maintain prop-
erty values . . ., not to suppress the xpression of unpopular views.').
172. Reed, 707 F.3d at 1077 ("[D]istinctions based on the speaker or the event are
permissible where there is no discrimination among similar events or speakers.").
173. See, e.g., G.K. Ltd. Travel v. City of Lake Oswego, 436 F.3d 1064, 1077 (9th
Cir. 2006) (finding that exemptions from sign permitting for public agencies, hospitals
and railroad companies did not establish any content preference, but rather simply
allow certain speakers the ability to speak without a permit).
174. See Reed, 707 F.3d at 1062.
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The concept of, and legal doctrine associated with, speaker based
regulation is murky, and the Supreme Court does disappointingly little
to provide clarification in this regard. The Supreme Court majority in
Reed disagreed both with the Ninth Circuit's finding that Gilbert's
code provision was even speaker based at all, and with the lower
court's determination that speaker based laws are automatically consti-
tutionally permissible. In rejecting the Ninth Circuit's statements on
speaker based regulation, Justice Thomas wrote, "the fact that a dis-
tinction is speaker based does not ... automatically render the distinc-
tion content neutral," and went on to say that the Court has "insisted
that 'laws favoring some speakers over others demand strict scrutiny
when the legislature's speaker preference reflects a content prefer-
ence.' "175 Justice Thomas used two examples to explain his point: a
law limiting the content of newspapers alone "could not evade strict
scrutiny simply because it could be characterized as speaker based"
and, similarly, a law regulating the political speech of corporations
could not be made content neutral by singling out corporations.'
7 6
It is not clear from the majority opinion, however, whether the
Court's intends that all speaker based regulations be subject to strict
scrutiny. The Court's statement that a law should be subjected to strict
scrutiny when a speaker preference reflects a content preference sug-
gests that an intermediate step might be required to determine whether
a speaker based regulation has an improper legislative purpose or moti-
vation. Justice Thomas's statement could simply require an application
of strict scrutiny to speaker based regulations, but the better approach
would be to shift the burden to government to demonstrate that its
speaker characterization is not based on a speaker preference, an inquiry
akin to what happens under the secondary effects analysis. Only when
government fails to meet that burden would strict scrutiny apply.
The Supreme Court's prior decisions referencing speaker-based reg-
ulation provide little meaningful assistance in interpreting Reed.
Turner Broadcasting, which contains the most significant discussion
of speaker based regulation, unanimously upheld a 1992 law requiring
cable television operators to carry local broadcast stations.17 7 The ap-
pellants in that case suggested that the law in question was unconsti-
tutional in part because it favored one set of speakers over another,
175. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2230 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 658).
176. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2230.
177. Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 634.
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i.e., broadcast programmers over cable programmers.7 8 Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, rejected the notion that all speaker
based regulations must be subject to strict scrutiny,179 and stated instead
that speaker based laws should be strictly scrutinized only when such
laws "reflect the Government's preference for the substance of what
the favored speakers have to say."' 80 As with Justice Thomas's Reed
opinion, Justice Kennedy's Turner Broadcasting opinion contains no
guidance as to how a court should determine that  speaker based law
is reflective of such an impermissible content preference.
Curiously, Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Turner Broadcasting,
which was joined by Justices Thomas, Scalia and Ginsburg, might pro-
vide more insight into the thinking of some of the current Court with
respect to speaker based regulation. Justice O'Connor, while stating
expressly that some speaker based laws "need not be subject to strict
scrutiny," questioned the Turner Broadcasting majority's view that the
speaker-based law in question did not reflect a content preference.'
8 1
Justice O'Connor found that Congress's justification for the broadcast
programmer preference was not neutrally justified, because it refer-
enced a desire for programming diversity, which Justice O'Connor be-
lieved implicated content. 1
82
More recently, a majority of the current Court, in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission, overturned campaign finance laws lim-
iting the political speech of corporations-a well-defined class of
speaker-without making a single reference to the notion of speaker
based regulation.'83 And Sorrell-discussed above with respect to
the commercial speech doctrine-makes several disapproving refer-
ences to speaker based regulation, going to great lengths to describe
the doomed law in question as "content- and speaker-based," but
fails to engage in any discussion regarding the speaker based nature
of the law.184 Indeed, Justice Breyer's Sorrell dissent noted that the
Court had not previously imposed strict scrutiny on speaker-based
laws and the regularity with which regulations of commercial speech
are speaker based. 185
178. Id. at 657.
179. Id. ("To the extent appellants' argument rests on the view that all regulations
distinguishing between speakers warrant strict scrutiny . . . it is mistaken.").
180. Id. at 658.
181. Id. at 676 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 678.
183. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
184. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2663, 2666, 2667.
185. See id. at 2677-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The confusion regarding the constitutionality and analysis of
speaker-based laws exhibited by the Supreme Court has unfortunately
extended to lower courts as well. Some of the federal courts of appeals
have relied on Sorrell to require that any speaker-based law be subject
to strict scrutiny.'8 6 And yet, just ten days after the Supreme Court de-
cided Reed, the Eleventh Circuit, in reviewing a Florida law restricting
medical professionals from inquiring about patients' firearm owner-
ship and use, relied upon Supreme Court precedent upholding regula-
tions of speech by professionals and characterized such permissible
regulations as speaker-based laws.'
87
All of the foregoing should underline the extreme confusion among
the courts regarding speaker based laws. The Supreme Court precedent
discussed above suggests at the very least that local sign regulations
distinguishing between speakers on the basis of the speakers' identity
should be content neutral both on their face and in their justification.
After Reed, it seems near impossible that a court will allow speaker
based regulation to be used as a constitutional "escape valve" for
facially content-based laws. Moreover, if a sign regulation purports
to be speaker-based, the justification for the regulation should not ev-
idence or imply a governmental preference for the content or message
of a particular speaker over another.
Local jurisdictions may be unable to avoid some forms of speaker
based sign regulation. For example, most local sign codes distinguish
between signs based upon the land use(s) occurring where the sign is
located: sign size, height, and type allowances typically vary according
to the zoning district where the sign is located. It is arguable that regu-
lation of speech on the basis of land use is a form of speaker based reg-
ulation if, say, the owners of manufacturing businesses are allowed
more sign area than neighborhood churches. Neither of the authors of
this article believe that this type of regulation, whether correctly consid-
ered speaker-based or not, is impermissible after Reed,188 yet further
drilling-down of sign regulations according to specific land uses may
implicate the type of speaker based regulation that the Supreme Court
and lower courts dislike. For example, a sign code distinguishing
186. See 1-800-411-Pain Referral Serv., LLC v. Otto, 744 F.3d 1045, 1054 55 (8th
Cir. 2014); U.S. v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 165 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding law speaker-
based and subject to heightened scrutiny).
187. See Wollschlager v. Governor of Fla., _ F.3d _, 2015 WL 4530452, at
*24 (11th Cir. 2015).
188. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2233 (Alito, J., concurring) (approving of the distinc-
tion between "placement of signs on commercial and residential property.").
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between the signs displayed on properties in accordance with highly-
specific subcategories of land uses-single-family residential, multi-
family residential, restaurant, general retail, religious institution, manu-
facturing and assembly, etc.-may reflect a content preference, or sim-
ply a speaker preference that a court finds improper. More problematic
sign code provisions are those that differentiate among specific business-
types, i.e., "speakers," as regards allowable signage, such as a code al-
lowing gasoline filling stations to have taller or larger signs with change-
able copy, while limiting automobile tire stores to shorter or smaller
signs without changeable copy.
With all of the foregoing said, it is patently clear that the concept
and constitutionality of speaker based regulation remains unsettled,
and local governments are therefore advised to proceed cautiously in
this area of sign regulation.
G. Application of Strict Scrutiny
After Reed, if a challenged provision in a sign regulation "on its face"
considers the message on a sign to determine how it will be regulated,
the regulation is content-based and subject to strict scrutiny.189 The
Reed majority emphasized that if a sign regulation is content-based
"on its face" it does not matter that government did not intend to re-
strict speech or to favor some category of speech for benign reasons:
"In other words, an innocuous justification cannot transform a facially
content-based law into one that is content-neutral."'190 Further, a sign
regulation that is facially content-neutral, if justified by, or that has a
purpose related to, the message on a sign, or that was adopted "be-
cause of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys," is
also a content-based regulation.19 1 Whether content-based "on its
face" or content-neutral but justified in relation to content, Justice
Thomas specified that the regulation is subject to strict judicial scru-
tiny: it will be presumed to be unconstitutional and will be invalidated
unless the government can prove that the regulation is narrowly-
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.
192
1. WHAT ARE COMPELLING INTERESTS?
Court rulings prior to Reed found that aesthetics and traffic safety, the
governmental interests most commonly cited to support sign regulations,
189. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227.
190. Id. at 2228.
191. Id. at 2227 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
192. See id. at 2227.
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are not compelling interests. For example, the Eighth193 and Eleventh'94
Circuit recently reaffirmed that traffic safety and aesthetics are not com-
pelling interests, and two federal district court decisions found that while
traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental interests, they
are not compelling enough to justify content-based restrictions on
fully-protected noncommercial speech. 195 But the Reed majority opinion
calls these rulings into question, at least as regards to traffic safety,
stating that a sign ordinance that was narrowly tailored to allow certain
signs that "may be essential, both for vehicles and pedestrians, to guide
traffic or to identify hazards and ensure safety" well might survive strict
scrutiny.'
96
An Eleventh Circuit decision supports the notion that traffic safety
could be found to be a compelling governmental interest. In Solantic,
LLC v. City of Neptune Beach,'97 although the court rejected the city's
claim that traffic safety was a compelling governmental interest, i
noted: "We do not foreclose the possibility that traffic safety may in
some circumstances constitute a compelling government interest, but
[the city] has not even begun to demonstrate that it rises to that
level in this case."'198 Solantic thus stands for the proposition that,
with adequate factual support such as traffic impact studies and expert
witness testimony, traffic safety could be found to be a compelling
governmental interest. 199
Reed, of course, does not alter the lesser standard of review that
courts apply in challenges to sign code provisions that are determined
to be content-neutral. For example, a content neutral ban on all signs
posted on public property will still be subject only to some form of
193. Neighborhood Enters., Inc. H, 644 F.3d at 738 (ruling that "a municipality's
asserted interests in traffic safety and aesthetics, while significant, have never been
held to be compelling.").
194. Solantic, 410 F.3d at 1267 (concluding that a city's "asserted interests in aes-
thetics and traffic safety" are not "compelling.").
195. See Bowden v. Town of Cary, 754 F. Supp. 2d 794 (E.D. N.C. 2010), rev'd
and remanded on other grounds, 706 F.3d 294 (4th Cir. 2013); King Enters., Inc.
v. Thomas Twp., 215 F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. Mich. 2002). But see City of Sunrise
v. D.C.A. Homes, Inc., 421 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (ruling that aesthet-
ics, in and of itself, was a "compelling governmental interest" for purposes of deter-
mining legality of billboard ordinance).
196. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2232.
197. Solantic, 410 F.3d 1250.
198. Id. at 1268.
199. Id. But see, e.g., Nichols Media Grp., LLC v. Town of Babylon, 365 F. Supp.
2d 295, 308 (E.D. N.Y. 2005) (rejecting expert testimony on traffic safety as "infected
with industry bias .... ").
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intermediate scrutiny.200 But intermediate scrutiny still means that a
sign regulation loses its presumption of constitutionality, requiring
the government to demonstrate that a regulation serves a substantial
governmental purpose unrelated to the suppression of speech, is nar-
rowly tailored to achieve that purpose, and leaves ample alternative
avenues of communication.
20 1
Even before Reed, numerous sign codes could not meet that lesser
burden. For example: a federal court overturned an ordinance that lim-
ited the number of portable signs and the maximum time periods they
could be used because the city presented no evidence at trial to justify
the restrictions;20 2 the Ohio Supreme Court struck down a regulation
excepting signs on parking lots from a general on-site requirement be-
cause government offered no explanation for the exception;20 3 and a
New Jersey appellate court struck down a restriction on neon lighting
when the local government could not demonstrate how the ban ad-
vanced its purported aesthetic goals.
204
The extent of the burden these cases impose upon government is not
entirely clear, but it has sometimes been onerous. For example, one
federal court refused to consider aesthetics as a justification for regu-
lating portable signs because the city had not included the protection
of aesthetics in its recital of purposes.205 Whether that decision is doc-
trinally sound is debatable, but it cautions local governments to in-
clude in a sign code a purpose statement setting forth the interests un-
derlying the code, as well as offering their justifications in court.
2. WHAT IS NARROW TAILORING?
Although Justice Thomas used the term "narrowly-tailored" in de-
scribing the strict scrutiny test,20 6 that term can be confusing because
200. See, e.g., Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 817 (1984).
201. See, e.g., id. at 805.
202. See Rhodes v. Gwinnett Cnty., 557 F. Supp. 30, 32 33 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
203. See Norton Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 433 N.E.2d
198, 201 (Ohio 1982).
204. See State v. Calabria, Gillette Liquors, 693 A.2d 949, 955 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1997).
205. See Dills v. Marietta, 674 F.2d 1377 (lth Cir. 1982); see also Nat'l Adver. Co.
v. Town of Babylon, 703 F. Supp. 228, 235 (E.D. N.Y. 1989) (holding unconstitutional
an ordinance that contained no statement of purposes, and the government offered no
evidence at hearing or by way of affidavit about purposes, stating "[m]ere assertions
in a memorandum of law, otherwise unsubstantiated in the record, are ... insufficient."),
aff'd in part, rev'd in parn, 900 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1990), affd, 970 F.2d 895 (2d Cir.
1992); Bell v. Stafford Twp., 541 A.2d 692, 700 (1988).
206. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226 ("[N]arrowly tailored to serve compelling state
interests.").
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it is also used in describing the standard for intermediate scrutiny.
207
In Ward v. Rock Against Racism,20 8 the Supreme Court explained how
the narrow tailoring requirement differs between the two standards:
Lest any confusion on the point remain, we reaffirm today that a regulation of the
time, place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the
government's legitimate, content-neutral interests but that it need not be the least
restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so. Rather, the requirement of narrow
tailoring is satisfied "so long as the ... regulation promotes a substantial govern-
ment interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation."
20 9
As the Court made clear in Ward, narrow tailoring as applied under
strict scrutiny is far more demanding than when applied under inter-
mediate scrutiny, requiring that the regulation be the "least restrictive
means" for achieving the compelling governmental interest.
But what must government show to demonstrate that a challenged
sign regulation is the "least restrictive means" of achieving its govern-
mental interest? Obviously, it requires that government demonstrate
that no alternative regulation will achieve the regulatory objective at
issue while imposing a lesser burden on speech.210 In practice, this
means that a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that a hypo-
thetical alternative regulation is both less restrictive and equally effec-
tive as compared with the challenged regulation. The burden then
shifts to the government to refute the plaintiff's claim.
211
3. HOW STRICT IS STRICT SCRUTINY GOING TO BE?
Reed dramatically expands the regulatory scenarios in which strict
scrutiny now applies. Provisions that the majority of federal circuit
courts had previously considered to be content-neutral-such as regu-
lation of "categorical" signs-are now subject to strict scrutiny.2 12 In
Justice Kagan's words, "Countless cities and towns across America
have adopted ordinances regulating the posting of signs, while
207. Ward, 491 U.S. at 796 ("[Narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmen-
tal interest.").
208. Ward, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
209. Id. at 798-99.
210. See generally Alan 0. Sykes, The Least Restrictive Means, 70 U. CHI. L. REv.
403 (2003).
211. While this approach has been criticized because it allows the judiciary to
second-guess a legislative body without being subject to the realities of the democratic
process, see, e.g., Harold L. Quadres, Content-Neutral Public Forum Regulations, 37
HASTINGS L.J. 439, 473 (1986), such criticism is misplaced because it elevates
legitimate "political" concerns over individual rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment.
212. See, e.g., Cahaly v. Larosa, _ F.3d _, 2015 WL 4646922, at *4 (4th Cir.
2015) (acknowledging that prior circuit precedent regarding facially content based
regulation is overruled by Reed).
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exempting certain categories of signs based on their subject mat-
ter." 213 Because, in Justice Kagan's view, most of these provisions
are entirely reasonable, an unintended consequence of Reed's expan-
sion of strict scrutiny may be its dilution: "The consequence-unless
courts water down strict scrutiny to something unrecognizable-is that
our communities will find themselves in an unenviable bind: They will
have to either repeal the exemptions that allow for helpful signs on
streets and sidewalks, or else lift their sign restrictions altogether
and resign themselves to the resulting clutter."
214
Justice Breyer went further, observing that many government activ-
ities involve the regulation of speech, and that such regulations "al-
most always require content discrimination."215 He argued, "to hold
that such content discrimination triggers strict scrutiny is to write a
recipe for judicial management of ordinary government regulatory ac-
tivity. ' 2 16 Echoing Justice Kagan's concern about the potential dilu-
tion of strict scrutiny, Breyer wrote, "I recognize that the Court
could escape the problem by watering down the force of the presump-
tion against constitutionality that 'strict scrutiny' normally carries with
it. But, in my view, doing so will weaken the First Amendment's
protection in instances where 'strict scrutiny' should apply in full
force."217
While these are legitimate concerns, Justice Kagan's sense of alarm
is likely overstated as regards sign regulation. We think there is a good
likelihood that courts will refrain from any significant "dilution" of
strict scrutiny as applied to sign regulations, particularly as regards
the "least restrictive means" prong. Rather, we think that courts will
become more open to finding that traffic safety and pedestrian safety
concerns, when supported by technical/scientific studies and compe-
tent expert reports, are compelling government interests.218 With
that said, however, we do not believe it likely that courts will find aes-
thetic interests compelling, as there is a fair amount of circuit
213. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2236 (Kagan, J., concurring).
214. Id. at 2237 (emphasis added).
215. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2234 (Breyer, J., concurring).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 2235.
218. This prediction is mitigated by the fact that lower courts are frequently loath
to find that the requirements of strict scrutiny have been satisfied, however, a 2006
study showed that 22% of cases applying strict scrutiny in the free speech context up-
held the government regulation in question. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and
Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59
VAND. L. REv. 793, 844 (2006).
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precedent rejecting the notion the aesthetics should be deemed a com-
pelling interest.219 In contrast, because Justice Breyer's concern ex-
tends well beyond sign regulation, it may well sound an appropriate
note of caution.
III. Suggestions for Legal and Planning Practice:
A Risk Management Approach
While the Supreme Court's Reed decision is still very young and the
decision's complete impact remains to be seen, lawyers, planners, and
local government officials can take steps now to minimize legal risk
in the wake of the court's decision. Even before Reed, most local
sign codes contained at least some provisions of questionable constitu-
tionality, and the authors acknowledge that developing a 100% content
neutral sign code may be impossible for some, or even most, local gov-
ernments. Further, as Justice Kagan noted, such a code might not func-
tion well in addressing legitimate aesthetic and traffic safety concerns.
Sign code drafting is an often imprecise exercise, subject to the influ-
ences of planning, law, and, perhaps most importantly, local politics.
Planners and local government lawyers should therefore view sign reg-
ulation with an eye toward risk management. If the local government is
willing to tolerate some degree of legal risk, it may be appropriate to
take a more aggressive, if less constitutionally-tested approach to sign
regulation. Conversely, if the local government is unwilling to accept
the risks associated with more rigorous regulation of signs, it would
be advisable to adopt a more strictly content neutral-if less aestheti-
cally effective-approach.
In a risk management approach to sign regulation, the local govern-
ment's adopted regulations should reflect a balance between the com-
munity's desire to achieve certain regulatory objectives and the commu-
nity' s tolerance for legal risk.220 Regardless of some of the uncertainties
that we have presented in this article, Reed's outcome increases the
level of legal risk associated with many aspects of sign regulation. In
keeping with our recommendations, communities are advised to review
sign regulations for potential areas of content discrimination and to take
precautions against potential sign litigation, but the authors also advise
communities to consider (or perhaps reconsider) the level of legal risk
219. See, e.g., Solantic, 410 F.3d at 1267; Whitton, 54 F.3d at 1409; Arlington
Cnty. Repub. Comm. v. Arlington Cnty., 983 F.2d 587, 594 (4th Cir. 1993).
220. See CONNOLLY & WYCKOFF, infra note 230, at 1-3 to 1-4.
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that the community is willing to tolerate in order to preserve the aes-
thetic character of the community and to further the safety interests
of community members. In some areas of sign regulation and for
some local jurisdictions, preservation of aesthetic character may run
counter to minimizing legal risk, and it will be up to planners, lawyers,
political leaders, and community members to determine the appropriate
balance between the community's desired planning outcomes and the
community's risk tolerance.
In all communities, special care should be taken to avoid regulating
signs that have minimal impact on the community's established inter-
ests in sign regulation. For example, avoiding regulation of signs
which are not visible from a public right-of-way, or which are small
enough in size so as to have a negligible visual impact is good sign
regulation practice and is in keeping with the notion that regulations
should only go as far as necessary to further the interests of the regu-
lating body. In the same vein, communities should focus on addressing
"problem areas" of sign regulation specific to the community instead
of regulating for problems that do not exist. Employing this approach
to sign regulation will likely result in the outcomes desired by the
community while providing an appropriate level of protection against
costly and time-consuming litigation.
With these observations in mind, this section provides some practi-
cal advice for lawyers and planners navigating sign regulation issues
in the post-Reed world.
A. Review Local Sign Codes Now for Areas of
Content Bias
Because local sign codes frequently contain at least some areas of con-
tent bias, in the immediate future, lawyers and planners should under-
take a microscopic review of local sign codes to determine where and
how the code engages in the types of content discrimination called into
question by Reed. Local sign codes are often an amalgam of reaction-
ary regulatory provisions that respond to discrete sign regulation prob-
lems that have arisen i the community. Furthermore, the most com-
mon sense reactions to many sign regulation problems may be the
reactions that raise the greatest problems in First Amendment analysis;
for example, addressing a proliferation of temporary political signs by
imposing strict regulations on such signs could be catastrophic from a
liability perspective. Therefore, even sign codes enacted comprehen-
sively can contain elements of content bias that would be invalidated
by a court following Reed.
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Where a municipal attorney or local planner lacks certainty as to
whether a particular provision is content neutral, contact a lawyer
well-versed in First Amendment issues and sign regulation. Even if
a sign code "fix" is not possible in the near term, knowing the sign
code's areas of vulnerability, and coaching permitting and enforce-
ment staff to limit potential problems, can be a crucial step toward
protecting a local government from liability.
To guide the process of reviewing local codes for content based pro-
visions, we have created a short list of critical areas to review.
1. REVIEW EXCEPTIONS TO PERMITTING
REQUIREMENTS
Exceptions to permitting requirements are common features of sign
codes, but hese exceptions often raise constitutional problems. The Gil-
bert sign code at issue in Reed mirrored many codes in place throughout
the nation; the code had a general requirement that all signs obtain a
permit, with several categories of excepted signs.221 Exceptions from
permitting can be problematic from both a content neutrality and narrow
tailoring perspective. On the content neutrality side, local governments
should closely review how the excepted signs are defined. For example,
are there exceptions to permitting requirements for political signs, elec-
tion signs, campaign signs, religious signs, real estate signs, construc-
tion signs, address signs, governmental flags, or any other types of
signs that might be defined by the message(s) displayed on the signs?
On the narrow tailoring side, local governments should consider
whether the exceptions to permitting requirements further the asserted
purpose for the sign code or are at least sufficiently limited to avoid un-
dercutting the stated purpose. For example, if a code contains the ex-
press goal of eliminating sign clutter to improve traffic safety and aes-
thetics, does allowing "Grand Opening Signs" somehow nullify that
aesthetic interest--or nullify the government's interest in prohibiting
myriad other temporary signs? Or if a code allows certain types of un-
permitted noncommercial signs to be larger than real estate signs, is the
government undermining its general interest in reducing driver distrac-
tions (since drivers can be distracted just as easily by political signs as
by real estate signs)? Removing content-based efinitions from excep-
tions to permitting requirements, and reconsidering whether the
221. See, e.g., DENVER, COLO. ZONING CODE § 10.10.3.1 (containing a list of signs
not subject to a permit).
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exceptions undermine the regulatory purposes of the sign code will as-
sist local governments in mitigating liability going forward.
2. REDUCE OR ELIMINATE EXCEPTIONS AND
SIGN CATEGORIES
Section III.A. 1 instructs lawyers and planners to review exceptions to
permitting requirements, thus it follows that the number of permitting
exceptions should be reduced wherever possible, while maintaining
those permitted exceptions-and their definitions-that are necessary
to reduce litigation risk or achieve stated goals of the sign code. The
same holds true for differentially-treated categories of signs. The Gil-
bert sign code in Reed contained 23 categorical exceptions to the
town's basic permitting requirement. While neither of the authors
was present for the enactment of these 23 exceptions, we can assume
without any comprehensive investigation that at least some of these
exceptions-and the differential treatment between the various catego-
ries of exceptions-were not necessary to achieve the code's stated
goals of traffic safety and community aesthetics. It is the authors' ob-
servation from our combined experience in sign regulation that exces-
sive "slicing and dicing" of sign categories frequently leads to more
litigation and liability for local governments. Thus, local governments
are encouraged to exercise restraint in creating permitting exceptions
and avoid multiple categories of permitted exceptions.
The foregoing is not to say, however, that local governments should
avoid all exceptions to permitting and require permits for all signs.
Permitting requirements carry additional constitutional obligations
for local governments, most importantly the obligation to avoid un-
constitutional prior restraints on speech. For a permitting requirement
to avoid such concerns, it should contain adequate procedural safe-
guards. Such a requirement should provide strict yet brief review time-
frames to which the local government must adhere and must not vest
unbridled discretion in local government officials, i.e., the code should
contain clearly-articulated approval criteria for signs subject o a per-
mit22 If a local government opts to require that noncommercial signs
be permitted prior to installation, the code should avoid content discri-
mination in the requirements for permitted noncommercial signs. Pre-
cisely because of prior restraint concerns and the sensitivity of non-
commercial sign owners to prior restraints, many local governments
222. See, e.g., Caf6 Erotica of Fla., Inc. v. St. Johns Cnty., 360 F.3d 1274, 1282
(lIth Cir. 2004); Lusk v. Vill. of Cold Spring, 475 F.3d 480, 485-87 (2d Cir. 2007).
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opt to except certain forms of noncommercial signage from permitting
requirements. If the sign code drafters desire to except political signs
from a permitting requirement, that exception-and the treatment of
the excepted signs in terms of size, height, lighting, etc.-should
apply equally to all noncommercial signs, regardless of the message
on the sign.
3. REMOVE "PROBLEM" DEFINITIONS SUCH AS
"POLITICAL SIGNS," "RELIGIOUS SIGNS," "EVENT
SIGNS," "REAL ESTATE SIGNS," AND "HOLIDAY
LIGHTS"
To avoid post-Reed liability associated with certain types of noncom-
mercial speech, local governments should remove or reconsider poten-
tially problematic categories and definitions in sign codes. Some of
these problem definitions include "political signs," "religious signs,"
"event signs," "real estate signs," and "holiday lights." These catego-
ries are problematic for two reasons. First, when used in local sign
codes, these categories typically rely upon the subject matter or mes-
sage of the sign itself to define the category, which is presumptively
unconstitutional after Reed, thus giving rise to potential liability for
the government.223 The second reason is that, in most cases, these cat-
egories relate to core First Amendment-protected speech, with con-
comitant heightened public sensitivity that can easily lead to litigation.
Whereas many commercial business owners are disinclined to spend
time and money litigating over sign regulations, individuals and not-
for-profit organizations, many of whom are represented by pro bono
legal counsel in First Amendment cases, are inclined to spend time
and money to preserve core First Amendment rights.224 Reed is a per-
fect example: the litigation lasted eight years, and Pastor Reed and
Good News were represented by pro bono legal counsel.
225
223. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227.
224. Because First Amendment challenges to sign codes are normally brought
under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows for the award of attorneys'
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, pro bono and other-counsel may be very interested in
representing plaintiffs in these challenges. See, e.g., Cleveland Area Bd. of Realtors v.
City of Euclid, 965 F. Supp. 1017, 1026 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (awarding $308,825.70 in
attorneys' fees and costs in sign code case). Adjusting for inflation, that award is equal
to $457,225.60 in current dollars.
225. Pastor Reed and Good News were represented pro bono by the Alliance De-
fending Freedom. See Alliance Defending Freedom, Vital Signs: One tiny church
prompts a Supreme Court debate on whether some speech is more valuable than oth-
ers, FAITH & JUSTICE (vol. VIII, issue 2, 2015), available at http://www.adflegal.org/
detailspages/faith-and-justice-details/vital-signs.
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In some cases, the problem areas can be regulated with sign code
definitions that do not directly control or restrict the content of the
sign in question. As discussed above, a potentially content neutral def-
inition of "real estate sign" could be "a temporary sign posted on prop-
erty that is actively marketed for sale." Such a definition does not ad-
dress the content of the sign, but rather deals with the status of the
property and location of the sign. Thus, a for-sale property could the-
oretically be posted with a "Save the Whales" sign under this defini-
tion, but it is likely that the economic motives of the seller would dic-
tate otherwise. While this approach lowers legal risk, it does not
eliminate it. If such a provision were challenged, a plaintiff might suc-
cessfully claim that the purpose for the facially content-neutral defini-
tion was to allow for the display of real estate signs, which would then
subject the provision to strict scrutiny. Similarly, if the definition of
"event sign" is "a temporary sign displayed within 500 feet of property
on which a one-time event is held, and which sign may be displayed
for up to five days before and one day after such event," the "event
sign" could read "Smoke Grass," but the event proponent's interest
in promoting the event would likely win the day.
In other cases, some of the problem sign types should simply be
avoided. For example, it is nearly impossible to define "political
sign" or "religious sign" in a manner that does not create serious con-
tent bias issues. If a community has concerns regarding proliferation
of these sign types, the problem is best addressed with regulations ap-
plicable to all noncommercial signs. As Reed espouses, it is not within
the purview of local government to pick and choose the subject matter
or message of noncommercial speech, or to favor certain types of non-
commercial speech over others. To the extent local political leaders
are concerned about proliferations of political or religious signs, law-
yers and planners should endeavor to educate political leaders about
the risks associated with sign regulations of this nature.
B. Avoid Strict Enforcement of Content Based
Distinctions and Moratoria
Local governments are also well-advised to suspend enforcement of
code provisions-particularly regulation of temporary signs-that
are called into question by Reed. Obviously, however, all sign code
structural and locational provisions directly related to public safety
should continue to be enforced. In a case decided shortly before
Reed, a federal court upheld an Oregon county's decision to cease en-
forcement of content based provisions in the county code and to
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instead review applications for temporary sign permits under the re-
maining, content neutral provisions of the code.226 This decision pro-
vides a superb road map for a jurisdiction considering how it might
administer, in the near term, a content based local sign code.
Some local governments may believe that a prudent response to
Reed is to enact a moratorium on the issuance of sign permits during
the pendency of code revisions. That approach is problematic. Mora-
toria, if challenged, would in most circumstances constitute an uncon-
stitutional prior restraint on expression.227 Courts strongly disfavor
moratoria on issuing any sign permits or, worse yet, displaying any
new signs. In contrast, a moratorium of short duration-certainly no
more than 30 days-that is narrowly tailored to address only the issues
raised by Reed might possibly be upheld. The authors, however, do not
recommend this approach.
C. Ensure that Sign Codes Contain the Three
"Basic" Sign Code Requirements
While the authors understand the complexity inherent in sign regula-
tion following Reed, there are three easy steps that lawyers and plan-
ners can take now to reduce legal risk associated with sign code liti-
gation. These are discussed in this Section.
1. PURPOSE STATEMENT
All sign codes must have a strong, well-articulated purpose statement
to pass constitutional muster. Although Reed rejected the notion that
only a content neutral purpose is sufficient to withstand a First Amend-
ment challenge, governmental intent remains an important factor in
sign code drafting and litigation.228 After all, the first prong of both
the intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny tests focuses on whether
226. See Icon Groupe, LLC v. Washington Cnty. 2015 WL 3397170, at *8, *13 (D.
Or. 2015).
227. See, e.g., Schneider v. City of Ramsey, 800 F. Supp. 815 (D. Minn. 1992),
aff'd sub nom. Holmberg v. City of Ramsey, 12 F.3d 140, 144-45 (8th Cir. 1994) (in-
validating, as prior restraint, moratorium passed to allow city time to draft zoning reg-
ulations for adult uses); Howard v. City of Jacksonville, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1365
(M.D. Fla. 2000) (finding a moratorium on the issuance of permits for adult entertain-
ment businesses invalid as an unconstitutional prior restraint on expression).
228. In Desert Outdoor Adver. v. City of Moreno Valley, the Ninth Circuit struck
down a local sign ordinance simply on the grounds that it failed to articulate a regu-
latory purpose. 103 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1996). A local government's articulation of
a regulatory purpose provides an evidentiary basis for the first prong of the interme-
diate and strict scrutiny tests.
FALL 2015
SIGN REGULATION AFTER REED 617
the government has established a "significant" (intermediate) or "com-
pelling" (strict) regulatory interest.2 29
In Metromedia, the Supreme Court upheld both traffic safety and
community aesthetics as significant governmental interests sufficient
to satisfy the intermediate scrutiny examination. Since that time, it
has been standard practice for local governments to articulate traffic
safety and aesthetics as regulatory interests supporting sign regula-
tions. Although these are certainly the most-recited regulatory inter-
ests in local sign codes, and the ones most routinely acknowledged
by courts as meeting the intermediate scrutiny test's requirement of
a significant governmental interest, other regulatory interests may suf-
fice as well. Other regulatory interests articulated in local sign codes
include blight prevention, economic development, design creativity,
prevention of clutter, protection of property values, encouragement
of free speech, and scenic view protection.
230
2. SUBSTITUTION CLAUSE
The second sign code "must-have" is frequently called a "substitution
clause." A substitution clause is designed to avoid the problem iden-
tified in Section II.C above: unconstitutional, content based prefer-
ences for commercial speech over noncommercial speech resulting
from bans or limitations on off-premises signage, or generous allow-
ances for certain commercial signs.231 A very simple statement, the
substitution clause expressly allows noncommercial content to replace
the message on any permitted or exempt sign.232 For example, where a
sign code allows onsite signs for, say, big-box retailers to be larger
than other signs allowed in the community, the message substitution
clause allows the big box retailer to replace the onsite sign with a non-
commercial message advocating a political position or supporting a
particular cause, avoiding the constitutional problem that would other-
wise arise if a commercial sign were permitted to the exclusion of a
noncommercial sign.
233
229. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2231.
230. See BRIAN J. CONNOLLY & MARK A. WYCKOFF, MICHIGAN SIGN GUIDEBOOK: THE
LOCAL PLANNING AND REGULATION OF SIGNS, 12-3, 13-3 (2011), available at http://
scenicmichigan.org/sign-regulation-guidebook.
231. See discussion infra section II.C.
232. See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER, ANDREW BERTUCCI & WILLIAM EWALD, STREET
GRAPHICS AND THE LAW, 51 PLANNING ADVISORY SERV. REP. No. 527, (Am. Plan. Ass'n
rev. ed. 2004).
233. The authors note that many of the problems of the Gilbert sign code at issue in
Reed would have been resolved with a strong substitution clause, although it is
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3. SEVERABILITY CLAUSE
Severability clauses are added to sign regulations-and statutory pro-
visions more broadly-to uphold the balance of a code in the event a
court finds a particular provision invalid.234 In the context of sign reg-
ulations, severability clauses have always been extremely important
and are even more so after Reed.2 35 Facial challenges to sign codes
are more common than facial challenges to zoning codes or other
local regulations. Severability clauses hedge against the possibility
that a court will rule that a sign code is invalid in its entirety rather
than merely invalidating one or more provisions. Without a severabil-
ity clause, an invalidated sign code could result in a regulatory vacuum
without sign regulations, forcing local governments to either allow all
signs-an aesthetic anarchy from which recovery would be difficult-
or to adopt roughshod regulations or moratoria that could cause addi-
tional constitutional problems. For these reasons, adopting a severabil-
ity clause into the sign code is an important protective step for local
governments to take.
D. Apply an Empirical Approach to Justify Sign
Regulations, Where Possible
As discussed above in Section III.C. 1, sign codes require justification
with purpose statements. Recitations of regulatory purposes hould be
supported by some form of empirical study or data. Short, glib state-
ments regarding regulatory purposes do not reflect any degree of
thoughtfulness regarding sign regulations, and they leave a local gov-
ernment without evidentiary support for its stated purposes in the
event of litigation. To that end, local governments should consider em-
ploying at least some study and analysis in preparing regulatory
purpose statements. Two approaches are discussed below. Using a
comprehensive planning process to identify aesthetic concerns
questionable whether such a clause would have achieved the town's pre-Reed regula-
tory objectives.
234. See, e.g., BOERNE, TEX., SIGN ORDINANCE § 18 (2008) ("If any portion of this
ordinance or any section or subdivision thereof be declared unconstitutional or in vi-
olation of the general laws of the state, such declaration shall not affect the remainder
of this ordinance which shall remain in full force and effect."); CITY OF FARMINGTON,
MICH. ZONING ORDINANCE § 35-233 ("This chapter and the various components, arti-
cles, sections, subsections, sentences and phrases are hereby declared to be severable.
If any court of competent jurisdiction shall declare any part of this chapter to be un-
constitutional or invalid, such ruling shall not affect any other provision of this chapter
not specifically included in said ruling.").
235. Even if the sign code is contained within the zoning code, the authors strongly
recommend a separate severability clause be placed in the sign code.
FALL 2015
SIGN REGULATION AFTER REED 619
generated by signage, or employing traffic safety analysis can assist in
purpose statement preparation.
1. TRAFFIC SAFETY STUDIES
While many local sign codes recite traffic safety as a central purpose for
sign regulation, very few substantiate the conclusion that a proliferation
of signs-or certain types of signs-has actually caused traffic safety
concerns in the community. Indeed, some lawyers and sign industry ad-
vocates have questioned whether signs-particularly in a world of smart
phones, navigation systems, and other driver distractions-contribute at
all to driver distraction and traffic incidents. Local governments are
therefore advised to conduct studies, or at least consult studies prepared
by national experts, to more carefully determine the safety concerns as-
sociated with outdoor signage.236 Local government fire and safety per-
sonnel may also be helpful in documenting, even if only anecdotally,
their concerns about traffic safety issues associated with too much or
too little signage. For example, employing traffic safety study data or
documentation provided by fire and safety personnel to determine the
appropriate location, height, size, brightness, etc. of signage along
major thoroughfares provides a local government with the type of evi-
dence required to craft sign regulations that respond to stated traffic
safety concerns, as well as the evidentiary support necessary to defend
a sign code in the event of litigation.
Evidence-based sign regulation is a growing area of study, and com-
plete coverage of this issue is tangential to the subject of this article.
Readers are advised to consult the resources in the footnotes to learn
more about this trend.
2. COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING
Comprehensive planning is another source of empirical study that can
be used to justify and defend sign codes. Signs are not often the focus
of comprehensive planning, however, the visual impact of signs on
communities and corridors weighs in favor of including sign issues
in communities' land use planning processes. To the extent signs
are addressed in a local comprehensive plan, the plan can help to iden-
tify and direct sign regulation toward the most pressing sign issues in
236. See, e.g., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., THE EFFECTS OF COMMERCIAL ELECTRONIC VAR-
IABLE MESSAGE SIGNS (CEVMS) ON DRIVER ATTENTION AND DISTRACTION: AN UPDATE,
Publ'n No. FHWA-HRT-09-018 (Feb. 2009), available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/
real estate/cevms.pdf. See also DAWN JOURDAN ET AL., AN EVIDENCE BASED MODEL
SIGN CODE (2011), available at http://www.dcp.ufl.edu/files/8c7lfaO3-9cbf-4af2-9.pdf.
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the community. Moreover, a good comprehensive plan containing ro-
bust analysis of sign issues in the community provides good eviden-
tiary support in sign code litigation.
E. Regulation of Sign Function in a Content Neutral
World: Construction Signs, Real Estate Signs,
Wayfinding Signs, Political/ideological Signs, etc.
Perhaps the most vexing post-Reed problem faced by local jurisdic-
tions is how to continue to regulate signs according to function or cat-
egory without becoming crosswise with a district court judge. For
some communities, it may be possible to avoid functional sign regula-
tion altogether through uniform regulations of temporary signs-
regardless of message. For other jurisdictions, however, that may
not be possible for various planning or political reasons.
Reed condemns all facial distinctions between messages, including
those that "are more subtle, defining regulated speech by its function or
purpose."237 Therefore, as a starting point, local governments must
avoid defining functional sign types according to the language or message
that appears on the face of the sign. By now, it should be clear that estab-
lishing distinct rules for political, religious, or ideological signs is virtu-
ally impossible without engaging in content regulation. A local govern-
ment that maintains regulations specific to these sign types risks
treating forms of noncommercial messages differently, which may pre-
cipitate a sign code challenge. As much as some local politicians may
wish to see regulation of political signs, specialized political sign regula-
tions are simply barred after Reed.
This is not to say, however, that local governments cannot regulate
signs according to structural, temporal, or other time, place, and
manner-type distinctions. For example, local governments may still
regulate permanent signs differently from temporary signs in a content
neutral manner. These signs are easily distinguished based on struc-
tural characteristics-permanent signs are permanently affixed to the
ground, a wall, or some other device, while temporary signs are not.
Permanent and temporary signs may also be made of different materi-
als; permanent signs are frequently made of stone, metal or wood,
while temporary signs are predominantly made of plastic or cardboard.
Local governments may also regulate display time for temporary
237. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227.
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signs. It is not unconstitutional for a local government to say, for ex-
ample, that a temporary sign may be placed for a maximum of 90 days
at a time. Moreover, sign regulations may continue to place size limits
and numerical limits on total amount of signage per property.
It is therefore not inconceivable to think that a local government
could regulate political, ideological and other forms of noncommercial
signage as follows: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this code,
each parcel of real property shall be allowed, without a permit, an ad-
ditional thirty two (32) square feet of temporary noncommercial sig-
nage, not to exceed four (4) signs at any one time, for a period not
to exceed ninety (90) days per calendar year." This provision would
allow non-permitted, temporary, noncommercial signage, but restrict
that signage to certain size and number requirements, and to a certain
display time. Moreover, this code provision is content neutral, as it
does not limit or restrict what the sign might say-except that it
must be noncommercial.
While the authors believe that the foregoing code provision would
likely satisfy Reed, we also recognize that it may be difficult to en-
force and that it may not accomplish all of the objectives of the
local government. Another approach, albeit one with greater risk expo-
sure, is to define signs according the activities occurring where the
sign is located. For example, a content neutral definition of a "con-
struction sign" might be "a temporary sign placed within a parcel of
property upon which construction activities of any type are being ac-
tively performed." The code could contain definitions similar to this
one for real estate signs. "Grand opening signs" could be defined as
,.a temporary sign placed within a parcel of property, not to exceed
thirty two (32) square feet, and which may be displayed for a period
not to exceed ninety (90) days following the sale, lease, or other con-
veyance of the parcel or any interest therein." Event-based signs could
fall under a regulation that defines an "event sign" as "a sign not to
exceed twelve (12) square feet that is placed no more than two (2)
weeks prior to and no more than two (2) days following a registered
event," and which requires a registration of events with the permitting
jurisdiction.
Assuming the code provided a category for general temporary non-
commercial signage, these code provisions would be more likely to sat-
isfy Reed than a code that articulates definitions based solely on the
message of signs. We note, however, that the aforementioned provisions
have not been tested in courts, and even Reed may call into the question
the validity of such regulations under the rationale that these regulations
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exhibit subtle content bias. Even so, to the extent local governments de-
sire to regulate signs according to function, the authors advise against
such regulation, as any type of functional or categorical regulation
will lead to increased risk exposure for the local government.
F. Permitting and Enforcement
As with other areas of regulation, in addition to being informed by the
local government's tolerance for risk management, sign regulations
should also be based upon the local government's appetite for and
ability to enforce the regulations. Enforcement of sign regulations is
rarely an easy task, and improper enforcement of sign regulations
can lead to serious trouble.2 38 Local governments should therefore
consider the enforcement of sign regulations before and during the
drafting process, rather than after adoption of the regulations.
The authors have noted that he availability of online registration
systems may greatly ease enforcement headaches of local govern-
ments. For example, it may be possible for a local government to re-
quire any person displaying a temporary sign to register the sign with
the local government on its website. Such an online registration sys-
tem would not act as a bar to an individual's right to display a tempo-
rary sign, and would provide the local government with a registry of
the properties at which signs are posted, which would in turn allow
for better enforcement of size, height, and time restrictions on signs.
In such a scenario, the local government could cite property owners
with unregistered signs.
With the advent of digital technology, there is significant room for
creativity in enforcing sign regulations, so long as the local govern-
ment is not using such enforcement mechanisms to subvert First
Amendment obligations.
IV. Conclusion
Reed is likely to precipitate a significant shift in courts' treatment of
sign codes under a First Amendment challenge. Local governments
thus would be wise to undertake sign code reviews and, if necessary,
revise now to ensure that he code does not contain any of the content-
238. Selective enforcement claims arising in the enforcement of speech regulations
may give rise to liability for local governments. See, e.g., LaTrieste Restaurant and
Cabaret, Inc. v. Vill. of Port Chester, 40 F.3d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1994).
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based distinctions that created problems for Gilbert. Where necessary,
local governments should consult resources-including planners and
lawyers knowledgeable in First Amendment issues-to be certain
that sign codes do not carry more risk than the local government
desires to bear.
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